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ABSTRACT 
This Article presents the results of a quantitative analysis of writing 
style for the entire corpus of US Supreme Court decisions. The basis for 
this analysis is the measure of frequency of function words, which has 
been found to be a useful “stylistic fingerprint” and which we use as a 
general proxy for the stylistic features of a text or group of texts. Based on 
this stylistic fingerprint measure, we examine temporal trends on the 
Court, verifying that there is a “style of the time” and that 
contemporaneous Justices are more stylistically similar to their peers than 
to temporally remote Justices. We examine potential “internal” causes of 
stylistic changes, and conduct an in-depth analysis of the role of the 
modern institution of the judicial clerk in influencing writing style on the 
Court. Using two different measures of stylistic consistency, one 
measuring intra-year consistency on the Court and the other examining 
inter-year consistency for individual Justices, we find evidence that the 
writing styles of individual Justices have become less consistent as clerks 
have taken on a greater role on the Court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The written word is the medium through which the law travels: courts, 
agencies, and legislatures create law by producing text. In recent years, 
these legal texts have increasingly become available to the public in digital 
form. Together with advances in processing power, data storage, machine 
learning, and computational text analysis, the digitization of the law has 
opened a new frontier in empirical legal scholarship. A number of 
researchers have eagerly crossed over into this unexplored territory in 
search of new insights, methods, and questions.  
This Article contributes to this exciting new enterprise by undertaking 
the first general quantitative investigation of writing style on the US 
Supreme Court. While judicial writing style often serves as fodder for 
commentary, it has rarely been subject to systematic study.
1
 Systematic 
qualitative analysis is made difficult by the sheer bulk of the corpus, which 
prevents a human reader from digesting any more than a tiny sample. 
Perhaps for this reason, qualitative analysis of style tends to focus on the 
gems in judicial writing, examining the prominent writings of prominent 
Justices and neglecting the mine-run of workaday opinions.
2
 Scholars have 
only relatively recently combined accessible digital versions of the corpus 
 
 
 1. See infra Part I.B for some notable examples. 
 2. See, e.g., Richard H. Weisberg, Law, Literature and Cardozo’s Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 283 (1979) (providing qualitative discussion of the judicial writings of Justice Cardozo). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/6
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of judicial writing with the tools offered by computational text analysis to 
undertake quantitative analysis of style.
3
  
Prior attempts to analyze judicial writing style in a quantitatve way 
have typically been based on relatively small datasets, and are limited to a 
small number of specific stylistic features.
4
 This Article relies on a corpus 
of all cases in the US Supreme Court in the period from 1792 to 2008, 
compiled from publically available raw textual data that has been 
augmented with identifying information concerning the year, author, and 
opinion type.
5
 In addition to examining specific stylistic features culled 
from the prior literature on judicial writing style, we deploy a general 
stylistic measure that serves as a proxy for what Judge Posner refers to as 
“style as signature.”6 This general style proxy is first used to examine the 
gradual change in writing style over time, and then to investigate potential 
hypotheses about sources of stylistic variation over time. Perhaps most 
controversially, we find that the institution of the modern clerkship 
appears to have had an important effect on judicial writing style on the 
Court, both in the consistency of writing style in individual chambers and 
in the consistency of writing style of the Court as an institution.  
Our primary analysis relies on a commonly used measure of writing 
style based on the frequency of use of content-free words (also called 
“function words”). This measure provides a “useful stylistic fingerprint” 
and was used for a large-scale study of literary style executed by Hughes, 
Foti, Krakauer, and Rockmore.
7
 This stylistic approach has its roots in 
statistical methods to address the problem of author attribution.
8
 As will be 
discussed more thoroughly, our stylistic fingerprint measure allows for 
analysis of the similarity between texts or a group of texts, including texts 
that are grouped by time and by author. In our analysis, we use the stylistic 
fingerprint as a means of developing descriptive statistics and as the basis 
 
 
 3. See infra Part II.B.  
 4. See infra Parts II.B, IV.A. A study by Black and Spriggs of opinion length in the Supreme 
Court notably uses data covering the entire Court’s existence. See Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs 
II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621 
(2008).  
 5. Jonathan Ashley, research librarian at the University of Virginia, was primarily responsible 
for identifying resources, collecting cases, and providing the markup needed for analysis. We are 
extremely grateful for his efforts. 
 6. Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 
1425 (1995). Our stylistic measure is based on function word frequency. See infra Part II.C. 
 7. See James M. Hughes, Nicholas J. Foti, David C. Krakauer & Daniel N. Rockmore, 
Quantitative Patterns of Stylistic Influence in the Evolution of Literature, 109 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 
7682, 7682 (2012) [hereinafter HFKR (2012)]. 
 8. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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for testing a number of hypotheses concerning the evolution of judicial 
writing style in the Supreme Court. 
We first address the general relationship between style and time. The 
starting place for this analysis is the intuitive hypothesis that there is a 
“style of a time” in the Court.9 Stated somewhat more formally, the 
hypothesis is that as the distance in time between judicial writings 
increases, there is a lower likelihood that they will be stylistically similar. 
Our analysis finds that stylistic similarity decreases with distance in time, 
as expected. 
We also examine potential mechanisms that could drive this robust 
temporal trend. We examine the possibility that the writing style of 
particularly influential Justices propagates over time, so that the most read 
and cited Justices tend to project style forward. Perhaps surprisingly, we 
do not generally find that being widely cited increases the stylistic 
similarity between a past Justice and members of the current Court.
10
 We 
also examine the potential for party affiliation to have played a role in 
stylistic evolution. While initial analysis reveals some differences between 
Democratic-appointed and Republican-appointed Justices, these 
differences appear to be the result of the temporal trend (alongside the 
changing partisan balance on the Court over time) rather than the cause. 
We then examine whether substantive features of opinions influence their 
style. We find that there are robust stylistic differences between majority 
opinions and dissents, even when comparing the writings of the same 
Justice. The growth of dissents, and dissent-like writing styles, may 
account for some of the drift in writing style on the Court over time.  
We finally investigate the influence that the modern institution of the 
judicial clerkship has on writing style on the Court. For each Justice, we 
define a measure of consistency as the similarity between a Justice’s 
writings in one year and in all other years.
11
 We then test the hypothesis 
that the number of law clerks that a Justice employs is negatively 
associated with intra-Justice stylistic consistency. Overall, we find 
evocative evidence that the substantive role that clerks now play on the 
Court has led to decreasing inter-year intra-Justice stylistic consistency, 
 
 
 9. Id. at 7685 (finding quantitative support for a “style of the time” in Western literature). 
 10. This analysis of the “current court” included Justice Scalia because it was carried out before 
his death on February 13, 2016. For our measure of influence, we use the tables produced in 
Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 
(1998).  
 11. Our measure is described in more detail in Part II.C.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/6
  
 
 
 
 
2016] WRITING STYLE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1465 
 
 
 
 
while leading to increasing intra-year institutional stylistic consistency on 
the Court.  
The methodology and findings presented here are meant to serve as a 
starting place for future quantitative text-based analysis of the law and 
legal writing style. In particular, this Article serves as an invitation for 
researchers to engage in a broader examination of the causal factors that 
affect judicial writing style; of stylistic trends in other governmental 
institutions, including Congress and agencies; and of the dynamic 
relationship between writing style in political institutions and the broader 
culture. As discourse continues its move into the digital realm—as new 
content is created and earlier content is digitized—it opens the door for a 
rich inquiry into the relationship between literature, law, and mass media, 
and the relative influence (stylistic and otherwise) of each of these 
domains on the others. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I explains how our research 
contributes to existing literature on judicial writing style and the growing 
literature using computational text analysis as the basis for legal 
scholarship. Part II describes our data and methods and conducts some 
preliminary computational style analysis on our new data. Part III 
examines broad stylistic time trends on the Court to test the general 
hypothesis that contemporaneous Justices tend to exhibit more similarity 
in their writing styles. Part IV discusses potential mechanisms that may 
account for changes in style over time. Part V focuses on the influence of 
clerks on writing style on the Court, and specifically on the consistency of 
writing style exhibited by Justices. The conclusion summarizes and 
provides potential future directions for research using computational tools 
to analyze judicial writing style.  
I. COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL TEXTS 
Formalized analysis of the content of judicial decisions in both the 
legal and social sciences literatures has experienced substantial growth in 
recent years, and new computational tools have contributed to that growth. 
Some initial forays into systematic analysis of judicial writing style are 
part of this broader trend. This Part discusses the reasons for taking 
judicial writing style as an object of inquiry as well as recent advances in 
using quantitative tools to analyze judicial writings. 
  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions 
The ability to analyze the content of legal writing, and often judicial 
writing, is the stock-in-trade of the legal profession.
12
 Identifying relevant 
law, extracting legal principles, and applying those principles to factual 
circumstances is the basic work that lawyers are called on to do in their 
daily practice. Learning how to do that work is the basic goal of a legal 
education, and law students spend their time practicing and (hopefully) 
mastering this skill.  
While this type of qualitative content analysis is as old as the legal 
profession, quantitative analysis of legal content is a newer animal. Hall 
and Wright provide an overview of the growth in systematic content 
analysis, explaining that the goal of this research is to ground empirical 
conclusions about law in “the community’s ability to reproduce . . . 
findings rather than the author’s rhetorical power.”13 Such analysis begins 
by defining a relevant set of cases, which are then analyzed by human 
readers who “code” the case for pre-identified content elements.14 This 
information then serves as data for whatever analysis will be carried out, 
from analysis of ideology space on the Supreme Court to observations of 
relevant legal factors in classes of cases.
15
  
Systematic content analysis of legal opinions is now a mainstay of 
legal and political science scholarship. The Supreme Court Database
16
 and 
the U.S. Appeals Courts Database
17
 together have generated scores of 
research projects.
18
 Perhaps the most frequently discussed research 
concerns the relationship between judicial decision-making and “extra-
legal” or “ideological” factors,19 but content analysis has been deployed to 
 
 
 12. Law students may start with the sensation that reading judicial writing is akin to “stirring 
concrete with [their] eyelashes,” but most of them ultimately gain some degree of fluency in their 
newly acquired language. SCOTT TURROW, ONE L 31 (2d ed. 1988). 
 13. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 63, 66 (2008). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991) 
(conducting exhaustive search of cases concerning specific legal doctrine); Andrew D. Martin & 
Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) (developing novel measure of judicial 
ideology). 
 16. THE SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
 17. U.S. Appeals Courts Database, THE JUD. RESEARCH INITIATIVE, http://artsandsciences.sc. 
edu/poli/juri/appct.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2016). 
 18. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Political (Science) Context of 
Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783, 812 n.85 (2003) (noting reliance on Spaeth databases).  
 19. See generally LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL 
AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013); Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/6
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examine questions as far-flung as judicial deference to agency decisions
20
 
and the differences between state and federal court interpretation of the US 
Constitution.
21
 Systematic legal content analysis also extends beyond 
courts, and has examined, for example, the effect of public comments on 
the decisions of administrative agencies.
22
  
Some newer approaches to systematic content analysis substitute 
computational approaches for human readers.
23
 Oldfather, Bockhorst, and 
Dimmer use an automated approach to investigate the “responsiveness” of 
appellate court decisions to briefs.
24
 Calvin, Collins, and Corley use 
computational methods to examine the influence of parties’ briefs and 
lower court decisions on Supreme Court opinions.
25
 Smith uses machine-
reading techniques to attempt to distinguish fact-intensive from law-
intensive cases.
26
 Cheng et al. use automated content analysis to identify 
the contested values in congressional testimony and agency hearings over 
net neutrality regulation.
27
 Katz et al. apply an n-gram analysis to examine 
word frequency within the Supreme Court corpus, creating an online tool 
 
 
Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate 
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009). 
 20. Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and EPA in the 
Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,371 (2001). 
 21. Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower 
Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 233 (1999). 
 22. Keith Naughton et al., Understanding Commenter Influence During Agency Rule 
Development, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 258 (2009). 
 23. See generally An-Shou Cheng, Kenneth R. Fleischmann, Ping Wang & Douglas W. Oard, 
Advancing Social Science Research by Applying Computational Linguistics, 45 PROC. AM. SOC’Y 
INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2008); Michael Evans, Wayne McIntosh, Jimmy Lin & Cynthia Cates, 
Recounting the Courts? Applying Automated Content Analysis to Enhance Empirical Legal Research, 
4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1007 (2007). Computational approaches to content analysis also, of 
course, occur outside of the legal context. See, e.g., David Lazer et al., Computational Social Science, 
323 SCIENCE 721 (2009) (discussing potential for computational analysis to provide new methods of 
social science research); Rada Mihalcea, Courtney Corley & Carlo Stapparava, Corpus-based and 
Knowledge-based Measures of Text Semantic Similarity, 1 PROC. 21ST NAT’L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 775, 778 (2006) (applying computational analysis to database of summaries of news 
stories).  
 24. Chad M. Oldfather, Joseph P. Bockhorst & Brian P. Dimmer, Triangulating Judicial 
Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal 
Scholarship, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2012). 
 25. Pamela C. Corley, Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Bryan Calvin, Lower Court Influence on U.S. 
Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J. POL. 31 (2011); Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and 
Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468 (2008).  
 26. Joseph L. Smith, Law, Fact, and the Threat of Reversal from Above, 42. AM. POL. RES. 226 
(2014). 
 27. An-Shou Cheng, Emi Ishita, Douglas W. Oard, Kenneth R. Fleischmann & Ping Wang, The 
Role of Innovation and Wealth in the Net Neutrality Debate: A Content Analysis of Human Values in 
Congressional and FCC Hearings, 63 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1360 (2012). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1468 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1461 
 
 
 
 
that allows any interested person to examine word frequency by year.
28
 
Stiglitz analyzes word frequency in the Federal Register to test a rule’s 
level of controversy.
29
 Rice tests how well statistical “topic models” 
compare to the human coders for the Supreme Court Database.
30
 
Livermore, Riddell, and Rockmore exploit topic models to test hypotheses 
about agenda formation on the Supreme Court.
31
 Together, these scholars 
are placing computational methods firmly in the toolkit of legal studies. 
The study of judicial citation practices is also related to content 
analysis, although citation does not cleanly fall on one side of the style-
substance divide.
32
 Citation studies have examined the use of foreign law
33
 
and legislative history,
34
 and there is a growing body of literature that 
examines case citation.
35
 In particular, citation has been used to examine 
the relative influence of judges and judicial opinions.
36
 New computational 
tools have allowed judicial citations to serve as the basis for network 
analysis.
37
  
 
 
 28. Daniel Martin Katz et al., Legal N-Grams? A Simple Approach to Track the Evolution of 
Legal Language, 235 FRONTIERS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & APPLICATIONS 167 (2011). 
 29. Edward H. Stiglitz, Unaccountable Midnight Rulemaking? A Normatively Informative 
Assessment, 17 LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 137 (2014). 
 30. Douglas Rice, Measuring the Issue Content of Supreme Court Opinions Through 
Probabilistic Topic Models (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the 2012 Midwest Political Science 
Association Conference, Chicago, Ill., Apr. 13, 2012), available at http://static1.squarespace.com/ 
static/5557a550e4b0443afbea6783/t/55dc7c17e4b05465d92e94ad/1440513070923/issueMeasures.pdf. 
 31. Michael A. Livermore, B. Allen Riddell & Daniel Rockmore, Agenda Formation and the 
U.S. Supreme Court: A Topic Model Approach (Va. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 2, 2016), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2740126. See also David S. Law, 
Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (using topic models to examine 
constitutional preambles). 
 32. Using Judge Posner’s formulation, see Posner, supra note 6, at 1425, it is not clear whether 
and how much citation would need to be included in a “paraphrase” of a legal decision for it to be 
accurate. See generally Tom S. Clark & Benjamin Lauderdale, Locating Supreme Court Opinions in 
Doctrine Space, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 871 (2010) (using citation to develop more nuanced ideological 
variables for decisions). 
 33. David Zaring, The Use of Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 297 (2006). 
 34. David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of 
Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653 (2010) (quantitative analysis of citation to 
legislative history). 
 35. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the 
Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87 (2008); Yonatan Lupu & James H. Fowler, Strategic 
Citations to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (2013); Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 381 (2000). 
 36. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations, 97 IOWA 
L. REV. 693 (2012); Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme 
Court Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407 (2010); see also Kosma, supra note 10. 
 37. See, e.g., Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309 (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/6
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B. Non-Content Analysis: Why Style? 
Just as analysis of the content of judicial decisions is the routine work 
of the legal profession, judges, lawyers, legal academics, and law students 
have frequently turned their attention to non-content, stylistic features of 
legal writing as well.
38
 Practicing lawyers are often called on to persuade 
through the written word, and stylistic features of a text can contribute to 
(or detract from) its persuasive force. Guides on legal writing, geared 
toward law students and practicing attorneys, often pay substantial 
attention to non-content textual characteristics.
39
 A host of stylistic 
conventions distinguish legal writing from standard written English,
40
 and 
a lawyer’s competence is judged, in part, by the degree to which his or her 
individual stylistic voice conforms to this particular “professional 
discourse community.”41 
In literary analysis, style refers to the distinctive characteristics of an 
author’s writings.42 The juxtaposition of style and substance is sometimes 
used to define style as all of the characteristics of a text other than the 
substance.
43
 This is the sense that Judge Posner invokes when he defines 
 
 
 38. For example, the adoption of legal writing courses at American law schools evidences a 
desire to teach students appropriate writing style, in addition to facilitating a mastery of legal content. 
Of course, legal writing courses serve many purposes simultaneously, some of which can be content 
oriented. See David S. Romantz, The Truth About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the Law 
School Curriculum, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, 127–36 (2003) (providing a brief overview of the history 
of legal writing courses at American law schools); cf. MARK MCGURL, THE PROGRAM ERA: POSTWAR 
FICTION AND THE RISE OF CREATIVE WRITING 77–125 (2011) (linking the post-World War II rise of 
creative writing programs to the development of American literature in the same period).  
 39. See generally BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH: A TEXT WITH 
EXERCISES (2d ed. 2013); BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF: 100 TIPS FOR PERSUASIVE 
BRIEFING IN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS (3d ed. 2014); ROSS GUBERMAN, POINT MADE: HOW TO 
WRITE LIKE THE NATION’S TOP ADVOCATES (2011); see also Bret Rappaport, Using the Elements of 
Rhythm, Flow, and Tone to Create a More Effective and Persuasive Acoustic Experience in Legal 
Writing, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 65 (2010). For earlier examples of stylistic advice for judges in 
drafting opinions, see Griffin B. Bell, Style in Judicial Writing, 15 J. PUB. L. 214 (1966); Robert A. 
Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810 (1961).  
 40. Cf. Marilyn Warren, The Obligation to Communicate: The Interaction Between Language 
and the Law, 15 DEAKIN L. REV. 117, 127 (2010) (“Judges do not use Powerpoint presentations, signs, 
billboards, e-mail, blogs or Twitter to communicate their decisions.”).  
 41. Andrea McArdle, Teaching Writing in Clinical, Lawyering, and Legal Writing Courses: 
Negotiating Professional and Personal Voice, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 501, 501 (2006). 
 42. Stylistic analysis can allow for the attribution of a piece to an individual when authorship is 
in doubt. There is a long lineage of quantitative analysis of style for attribution purposes. See HFKR 
(2012), supra note 7, at 7682 (citing quantitative methods of stylistic analysis that date from the 
nineteenth century for use in dating Plato’s dialogues).  
 43. “There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing. One is its style. The other is its 
content. That, I think, about covers the ground.” Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. 
REV. 38, 38 (1936). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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style “as the range of options for encoding the paraphrasable content of a 
writing.”44  
There is substantial stylistic variation within legal writing. At the level 
of institutions, although a legal question might be resolved through a 
statute, opinion, or regulation, each lawmaking form follows particular 
conventions of structure, length, and organization that allow the reader to 
readily distinguish the writing of a judge from the writing of an agency 
rule-writer or legislative drafter. The structure of Supreme Court opinions 
has evolved from the seriatim opinions of earlier days to the multipart, 
multiple concurrence opinions of more recent years.
45
 Style also differs 
between judges. Some Justices are lionized for their writing style, others 
are mocked, and most are ignored.
46
 The writing style of individual 
Justices can sometimes be identified by human readers, and quantitative 
tools for attributing writings to specific Justices have been developed.
47
  
Although style is distinct from substance, it can still matter. Style may 
serve as an indicator of judicial temperament or disposition.
48
 Stylistic 
norms may constrain judicial writing in ways that ultimately affect judicial 
reasoning, and in turn, legal outcomes.
49
 The evolution of writing style 
may indicate broader substantive trends on the Court. Style can affect the 
comprehensibility and usability of the law.
50
 Finally, style may be 
deserving of study simply as an empirical feature of an important cultural 
artifact. 
 
 
 44. Posner, supra note 6, at 1423. 
 45. See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL 
AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES (2007) (conducting comprehensive analysis of evolution of form of judicial 
writing in the United States). 
 46. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Strong Opinions, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2011, available at 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/92773/elena-kagan-writings (praising Justice 
Kagan’s writing style).  
 47. See, e.g., William Li et al., Using Algorithmic Attribution Techniques to Determine 
Authorship in Unsigned Judicial Opinions, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 503 (2013). 
 48. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 6, at 1421 (suggesting a link between “pure” and “impure” 
writing styles and “formalist” and “pragmatist” judicial approaches); see also Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 833, 834 (1986) (“[E]xamin[ing] the role of language as an expression of ideology . . . .”); 
Warren D. TenHouten, Inferring Cognitive Structure from Text, 6 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 
100–02 (1995) (discussing research on how neurological conditions affect stylistic choices in language 
use); Philip E. Tetlock, Jane Bernzweig & Jack L. Gallant, Supreme Court Decision Making: 
Cognitive Style as a Predictor of Ideological Consistency of Voting, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1227, 1230–31 (1985) (attempting to link opinion language to personality characteristics of 
authoring Justices).  
 49. Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1283, 1286 (2008) (discussing benefits and problems of the practice of writing opinions for the quality 
of judicial reasoning). 
 50. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1455–57 (1995). 
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Judicial writing style has long been the object of qualitative analysis.
51
 
Commentators bring different standards to this enterprise, with some 
focused on the literary quality of a judge’s work while others focus on 
more quotidian characteristics.
52
 Observers of the contemporary Supreme 
Court lament the lost “play of intelligence”53 and the “decline and fall of 
the American judicial opinion.”54 Others have proposed ethical limitations 
on judicial writing style.
55
 The writing styles of specific judges have been 
the subject of careful qualitative analysis.
56
 Linguists have examined 
“legal English as a sub-language with its own style, syntax and 
terminology” for several decades.57 Specific rhetorical characteristics of 
judicial opinions have been parsed in close detail.
58
 
In the field of literary studies, quantitative tools have been brought to 
bear on the analysis of style for decades.
59
 Early work in this area was 
 
 
 51. See Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner’s Appellate Opinions, 
1981-82—Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During an Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 651, 673–83 (2000) (surveying earlier discussions of judicial writing style); see also Ray 
Forrester, Supreme Court Opinions—Style and Substance: An Appeal for Reform, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 
167, 173–80 (1995). 
 52. A University of Chicago symposium on the subject drew various candidates for the 
appropriate standard to judge judicial writing. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: Judicial 
Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1477 (1995); Posner, supra note 6; Schauer, 
supra note 50; Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995); James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1363 (1995); see also WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT (1996) (treating 
judicial opinions as literary genre); Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201 (1990); Walker Gibson, Literary Minds and Judicial Style, 36 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 915 (1961) (providing reflections on commonality between legal writing and literary writing, and 
the benefits to scholars in both areas of conversing across disciplines).  
 53. Daniel A. Farber, Missing the “Play of Intelligence,” 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 148 
(1994). For a more recent lament along the same lines, see Michael Serota, Intelligible Justice, 66 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 649 (2012).  
 54. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American Judicial Opinion, Part I: Back to 
the Future from the Roberts Court to Learned Hand—Context and Congruence, 12 BARRY L. REV. 53, 
53 (2009). 
 55. See, e.g., Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion 
Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 237 (2008); David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics 
of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 513–15 (2001). 
 56. See, e.g., ROBERT F. BLOMQUIST, THE QUOTABLE JUDGE POSNER 4–7 (2010); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 33–57 (1990).  
 57. Davide Simone Giannoni & Celina Frade, Introduction, in RESEARCHING LANGUAGE AND 
THE LAW: TEXTUAL FEATURES AND TRANSLATION ISSUES 7, 8 (Davide Simone Giannoni & Celina 
Frade eds., 2010); see also Judith N. Levi, “What Is Meaning in a Legal Text?” A First Dialogue for 
Law and Linguistics, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 771 (1995). 
 58. See, e.g., HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1992); James 
Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 684 (1985).  
 59. Richard W. Bailey, The Future of Computational Stylistics, in LITERARY COMPUTING AND 
LITERARY CRITICISM 3, 5 (Rosanne G. Potter ed., 1989) (originally presented at the Association for 
Literary and Linguistic Computing Fifty International Meeting, Friday, December 15, 1978, King’s 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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facilitated by basic statistics packages geared toward humanities scholars, 
such as LitStats.
60
 Computational analysis of style can be deployed on the 
level of the individual author or work or across wide swaths of literature, 
which is effectively the computational study of genre.
61
 
In the legal literature, there is a nascent movement to replicate this 
trend.
62
 An early important application of computational stylistic analysis 
by Mosteller and Wallace was directed at the attribution of the Federalist 
Papers.
63
 Little uses a coding procedure to identify “linguistic devices that 
obscure” meaning and analyzes Supreme Court cases on federal 
jurisdiction.
64
 Owens and Wedeking examine “cognitive clarity” in recent 
Supreme Court cases using the “linguistic inquiry and word court” 
(“LIWC”) software package.65 Long and Christensen examine the use of 
“intensifiers” and readability to test their theory that Justices broadcast 
weak legal position through use of language.
66
 Johnson examines 
readability over time in the Court, comparing Flesch-Kincaid scores in the 
1931–1933 and 2009–2011 terms,67 while Black and Spriggs examine 
 
 
College, University of London) (discussing “[a]pplication of the computer to problems of style” in 
literary analysis). The other essays in the same volume apply computational text analysis to the works 
of Milton, Chaucer, and Henry James, inter alia. Id.; see also Estelle Irizarry, Literary Analysis and 
the Microcomputer, 71 HISPANIA 984, 984 (1988) (discussing efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to 
computationally analyze literary texts on “huge mainframe computers” that processed “data on 
punched cards”; also noting that Jonathan Swift imagined computational text analysis in Gulliver’s 
Travels).  
 60. See Estelle Irizarry, LitStats, Version 1.62, 25 COMPUTERS & HUMAN. 455, 455 (1991) 
(lauding LitStats as “[u]ncomplicated, accurate, and easy to use”).  
 61. See generally FRANCO MORETTI, DISTANT READING (2013) (discussing program of applying 
quantitative text analysis to questions concerning literary criticism); see also MATTHEW L. JOCKERS, 
MACROANALYSIS: DIGITAL METHODS & LITERARY HISTORY 17–20 (2013) (discussing potential for 
computational analysis of literature).  
 62. For an early example of quantitative analysis of legal writing style, see generally Lawrence 
M. Friedman, Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright & Stanton Wheeler, State Supreme Courts: A 
Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981) (examing stylistic features such as citation 
frequency and opinion length). 
 63. Frederick Mosteller & David L. Wallace, Inference in an Authorship Problem, 58 J. AM. 
STAT. ASS’N 275, 275 (1963); see also FREDERICK MOSTELLER & DAVID L. WALLACE, APPLIED 
BAYESIAN AND CLASSICAL INFERENCE: THE CASE OF THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (2d ed. 1984). 
 64. Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction 
Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 80 (1998). Incidental quantitative examination of writing style is 
sometimes included in more content-focused analyses. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the 
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1003–04, 
1070–74 (includes information on opinion length in administrative law cases). 
 65. Ryan J. Owens & Justin P. Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity 
of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1027, 1038–39 (2011). 
 66. Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, When Justices (Subconsciously) Attack: The 
Theory of Argumentative Threat and the Supreme Court, 91 OR. L. REV. 933, 935–36 (2013). 
 67. Stephen M. Johnson, The Changing Discourse of the Supreme Court, 12 U. N.H. L. REV. 29, 
31 (2014).  
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opinion length over the entire period of the Court’s existence.68 Osenga 
analyzes patent claims to determine how they have changed in length and 
complexity over time, finding that length has remained relatively stable 
despite increasing complexity.
69
 As discussed in more detail below, there 
have been several attempts to study the influence of clerks over opinion 
drafting through computational analysis of writing style.
70
 Computational 
analysis of judicial writing style has even found its way into pop culture: 
Chilton, Jiang, and Posner use token analysis—a measure of sophistication 
in language use—to compare the vocabulary of several Justices to famous 
rappers and Shakespeare in a blog post on Slate.
71
 They find that Jay Z and 
most of the Justices have similar vocabulary use, while rapper Aesop Rock 
and Justice Holmes have exceptionally large vocabulary use, and DMX 
and Justice Kennedy are on the low end.
72
 
This Article adds to the existing literature in several ways. Our analysis 
uses more extensive data than prior research: all opinions of the Supreme 
Court from 1791 to 2008. With this larger data set, we are able to test and 
extend the earlier quantitative analyses. We also use a more general 
stylistic measure rather than analyzing specific elements of style. This 
measure allows us to examine style at a high level of abstraction, rather 
than restrict analysis to a specific stylistic feature in judicial writings. 
Finally, we are able to pair our data with existing content coding for a 
portion of our study period, allowing analysis of the interaction of judicial 
writing style and legal substance. 
II. MEASURING STYLE 
This Part describes our data and methodology and re-examines some of 
the prior work in computational style analysis based on our newly created 
dataset.  
 
 
 68. See Black & Spriggs, supra note 4, at 630. 
 69. Kristen Osenga, The Shape of Things to Come: What We Can Learn from Patent Claim 
Length, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 617, 634 (2012).  
 70. See infra Part V.A.  
 71. Adam Chilton, Kevin Jiang & Eric Posner, Rappers v. SCOTUS: Who Uses a Bigger 
Vocabulary, Jay Z or Scalia?, SLATE (June 12, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and 
_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/06/supreme_court_and_rappers_who_uses_a_bigger_vocabulary_ 
jay_z_or_scalia.html (taking the number of unique words over the total vocabulary as the measure of 
sophistication). 
 72. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Data 
Computational analysis of legal texts is hampered by difficulties 
accessing the relevant data.
73
 While judicial opinions are not 
copyrightable, the commercial databases that provide ready digital access 
to these opinions are protected by terms of use agreements.
74
 Limits on 
machine reading may be necessary to protect the proprietary content that 
has been produced by these publishers, but they can also inhibit academic 
research and access to the non-copyrighted government documentary 
information included within these resources. 
Public.Resource.Org, a private nonprofit corporation, has created a 
digital version of the Supreme Court and federal appellate court corpus 
based on the non-copyrightable information within the Westlaw database, 
and it published that information online at “bulk.resource.org.”75 The bulk 
resource data has been used in prior n-gram studies of text usage in the 
federal courts and Supreme Court,
76
 and it provides the public with access 
to a digital version of the nation’s judicial opinions. However, the bulk 
resource data has some important limitations, including a lack of readily 
identifiable author and date information. 
Because our analysis was limited to the Supreme Court, which has a 
relatively manageable universe of approximately 25,000 decisions, we 
were able to augment the Public.Resource.Org data to generate a new 
dataset. Human researchers conducted a series of “by year” searches on a 
commercial database to download digitized versions of all Supreme Court 
cases. All proprietary information was stripped out. Next, a series of 
iterative human and Python-based analyses were carried out to separate 
majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions and to assign an authoring 
Justice and year to each opinion.
77
 Per curiam decisions were removed 
from the dataset, as were opinions with a file size smaller than one 
 
 
 73. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Open Access in a Closed Universe: Lexis, Westlaw, Law 
Schools, and the Legal Information Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 797, 797 (2006) (discussing 
consequences of the “competitive duopoly” enjoyed by commercial legal publishers).  
 74. See, e.g., Terms of Use, THOMSON REUTERS, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-
products/about/legal-notices/terms-of-use (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).  
 75. BULK.RESOURCE.ORG, https://bulk.resource.org/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2016). 
 76. See Katz et al., supra note 28, at 2–3. 
 77. Python is an open source, general-purpose programming language that can be used for a 
variety of programming tasks. See generally What is Python? Executive Summary, PYTHON, 
https://www.python.org/doc/essays/blurb/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2016). 
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kilobyte. Data concerning the number of clerks employed in chambers was 
provided by the Supreme Court Library.
78
 
The resulting data covers all opinions for the years 1792 to 2008. Our 
data includes 25,407 decisions.
79
 We exclude footnotes from our analysis. 
There are roughly 8,000 dissents and 4,600 concurrences. We have data 
for 110 Justices: Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were appointed after the 
end of our study period. We have partial data for Justices who began their 
terms prior to 2008 but either retired after our study period or remain on 
the Court.
80
 Our analysis was conducted when Justice Scalia was an active 
member of the Court. 
B. Preliminary Analyses  
Before introducing the primary stylistic metric that is used for the 
balance of our analysis, we report the results from three preliminary 
analyses. 
1. Productivity 
Our first analysis examines the “productivity” of each Justice, as 
measured by the total number of words authored by that Justice in all of 
their opinions. Figure 1 presents the number of words produced by each 
Justice, with each Justice located on the horizontal axis according to his or 
her median year on the Court. An ordinary least squares (“OLS”) analysis 
comparing Justices’ production and their median year of service produced 
highly significant results.
81
 More recent Justices tend to produce more 
 
 
 78. The Supreme Court of the United States Library provided an unofficial list of clerks that was 
used as the basis for our analysis.  
 79. We define a “decision” as the set of opinions that relate to a case, identifiable through a 
citation in the United States Reporter, for example, “347 U.S. 483 (1954).” A decision can include 
multiple opinions, including a majority opinion, plurality opinions, and one or more dissents or 
concurrences. In our data, we do not distinguish majority from plurality opinions.  
 80. These Justices are Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony Kennedy, 
John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, and Clarence Thomas. 
 81. The coefficient is 6,831, the R-squared value is 0.32, and the p-value is less than 0.01%. 
Throughout this Article, we will conduct a series of very basic statistical tests on our data, including a 
number of ordinary least squares regression analyses. For a general introduction to regression analysis, 
see Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/ 
20.Sykes_.Regression.pdf. These statistical tests should be understood as a first cut analysis, meant to 
identify general relationships in writing style that are illuminated by the data and stylistic measure that 
we use.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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total words than Justices that served in earlier periods.
82
 The analysis of 
productivity excludes Justices that are currently sitting and the two non-
sitting Justices who left after the end of the study period (Justices Souter 
and Stevens), leaving a total of 101 observations.  
 
FIGURE 1: PRODUCTIVITY OVER TIME  
(EXCLUDING SITTING JUSTICES)  
 
There are many factors that could account for the growth in 
productivity over time, including longer average opinions, more opinions 
produced per year, and longer Justice length-of-service. Black and Spriggs 
provide a detailed treatment of time trends associated with opinion 
length.
83
 They find that while the number of decisions has declined since 
peaking around the turn of the century, concurrences and dissents have 
become much more prevalent.
84
 They also find that average opinion length 
tends to go through cyclical patterns.
85
 The cyclical pattern identified by 
Black and Spriggs was growth from 1790 with trend reversals in 1830, 
1870, 1900, and 1940, and a final period of growth thereafter.
86
 
 
 
 82. Earlier working paper versions of this Article (posted online on February 23, 2015, and 
March 11, 2015) carried out analysis of output examining only majority opinions, finding a coefficient 
of roughly 4,000.  
 83. Black & Spriggs, supra note 4, at 632–38. 
 84. Id. at 633 & fig.1. 
 85. Id. at 635 & fig.2.  
 86. Id. 
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Figure 2 presents an analysis of average opinion length by Justice, 
ordered by their median year on the Court.
87
 There is a general time trend 
in average length.
88
 The cyclical pattern identified by Black and Spriggs is 
roughly present (presented in Figure 2 as a four-year moving average) 
around a general trend of growth. It should be noted that while the time 
trend noted by Black and Spriggs was for opinion length by year (in 
words), the analysis presented here is the average opinion length by 
Justice (in characters), with the median year of service of the Justice as the 
explanatory variable.  
FIGURE 2: TIME TRENDS IN OPINION LENGTH  
 
  
 
 
 87. This analysis examines majority opinions only, excluding three Justices who authored only 
dissents or concurrences (Blair, Iredell, and Thomas Johnson). Justices with partial data are included, 
for a total of 107 observations. 
 88. The p-value for a simple linear time trend is less than 0.01%; the R-squared is 0.49. We 
examined variability in opinion length as well, finding no statistically significant time trend in the 
standard deviation of a Justice’s opinion length.  
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2. Friendliness 
Our next analysis examines the “friendliness” of each Justice, as 
measured by his or her use of positive and negative words. This analysis is 
based on a list of words constructed to examine the “sentiment” of written 
texts.
89
 Positive and negative words have been used to evaluate online 
reviews, among other texts, and analyzing their use has generally been 
found to be a useful means of engaging in computational analysis of large 
text corpora to “determine[] whether a document or sentence is 
opinionated, and if so whether it carries a positive or negative opinion.”90 
Some examples of negative words are “admonish” and “problematic.” 
Positive words include “adventurous” and “preeminent.” Together, there 
are around 7,000 words characterized as either positive or negative.
91
 
A Python script was programmed to determine for each Justice the total 
number of negative words and the total number of positive words in 
opinions authored. The numbers of negative and positive words were then 
each expressed as percentages of the total number of words authored by a 
Justice. The percentage of negative words was subtracted from the 
percentage of positive words to generate what we call a “friendliness 
score.” 
This analysis—while based on measures of sentiment that have been 
used in a variety of other contexts—should be approached with a healthy 
dose of skepticism. Comparing texts over a long time horizon may be 
problematic for a variety of reasons, including that a text that reads as 
 
 
 89. Bing Liu & Minqing Hu, Opinion Mining, Sentiment Analysis, and Opinion Spam Detection, 
UIC, http://www.cs.uic.edu/~liub/FBS/sentiment-analysis.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2016); see also 
Minqing Hu & Bing Liu, Mining and Summarizing Customer Reviews, 10 PROC. ACM SIGKDD INT’L 
CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 168, 169–70 (2004), available at 
https://www.cs.uic.edu/~liub/publications/kdd04-revSummary.pdf. 
 90. Bing Liu, Sentiment Analysis and Subjectivity, in HANDBOOK OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
PROCESSING 1, 32 (N. Indurkhya & F. J. Damerau eds., 2d ed. 2010), available at http://www.cs. 
uic.edu/~liub/FBS/NLP-handbook-sentiment-analysis.pdf.  
 91. For detail on the methods used to construct these lists, see id. In short, the list was 
constructed by using a small set of clearly positive and negative words as seed words. Positive seed 
words may include “good,” “amazing,” and “wonderful,” while the negative seed list might have 
“bad,” “terrible,” and “horrible.” These seed words are then analyzed in conjunction with an online 
dictionary that contains synonyms and antonyms. The computational analysis of the online dictionary 
adds the synonyms and antonyms of the seed words to the appropriate set and then iterates again, thus 
building up a dictionary of positive and negative words. The final lists were inspected by the 
researchers to remove any clearly misclassified words. A few more negative words that made the final 
list include “flawed,” “insulting,” “moronic,” and “unfounded.” Positive words include “convincing,” 
“fabulous,” “heroically,” and “sincerely.” This is a general description of how the list was constructed 
and glosses over some of the machine learning elements incorporated in the methodology. Readers 
with an interest should refer to the Liu piece, id., which provides a reasonably accessible introduction.  
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relatively friendly in one time period may read as downright nasty in 
another (or vice versa).  
With these caveats in place, our analysis finds a clear time trend toward 
lower friendliness scores. Table 1 includes the twenty Justices with the 
highest and lowest friendliness scores, ordered alphabetically, with their 
median year of service in parentheses. For this analysis, we exclude 
Justices with low total production.
92
 The analysis of the same data is 
shown graphically in Figure 3, with the median year of the Justice’s term 
on the horizontal axis and the friendliness score on the vertical axis.  
TABLE 1: TOP TEN HIGHEST AND LOWEST FRIENDLINESS SCORES 
Highest Lowest  
Henry Baldwin (1837) Samuel Alito (2007) 
Samuel Blatchford (1888) Stephen Breyer (2001) 
David Josiah Brewer (1900) Robert Jackson (1948) 
Samuel Chase (1803) Anthony Kennedy (1998) 
David Davis (1870) Joseph Rucker Lamar (1914) 
Stanley Matthews (1885) Sandra Day O’Connor (1994) 
Smith Thompson (1833) Antonin Scalia (1997) 
Willis Van Devanter (1924) David Souter (1999) 
Morrison Waite (1881) Clarence Thomas (2000) 
James Moore Wayne (1851) Byron White (1998) 
  
 
 
 92. We exclude the Justices who produced less than 100,000 words based on all of their writings 
(majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions). This leaves ninety-two Justices in our sample. We 
exclude the “low production Justices” because small total production makes it difficult to draw useful 
inferences; some of these Justices authored as little as a few hundred total words, leaving less than a 
dozen positive or negative words in their entire corpus.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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FIGURE 3: FRIENDLINESS SCORE BY MEDIAN YEAR 
 
The results are evocative: there is a highly significant negative 
correlation between time and friendliness scores.
93
 There are a variety of 
potential avenues that future researchers could explore to untangle the 
causes of this interesting correlation. Some of this effect may be due to an 
increasing number of dissenting opinions, or the use of less formal 
language on the part of the Justices, and may be skewed by the use, or 
non-use, of particular negative or positive words. The changing sentiment 
on the Court may also reflect broader changes in language usage in 
political institutions (such as Congress) or within the broader culture. The 
time trend in friendliness scores, and its causes and potential 
consequences, may be worthy of future analysis.   
 
 
 93. An OLS regression on this data showed an R-squared of 0.61 and a p-value of less than 
0.01%. Using data based on all 110 Justices adds some noise to the analysis but the results do not 
substantially change: the R-squared falls to 0.34 and the p-value remains below 0.01%. We also 
conduct the analysis on all only majority opinions, dropping the three Justices who only authored 
dissenting or concurring opinions, and arrive at similar results (R-squared falling to 0.27 and similarly 
low p-values). Dropping the lower production Justices from the majority only analysis reduces the 
noise considerably. For majority only opinions, dropping Justices with less than 100,000 words of 
production, the R-squared is 0.6. 
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3. Defensiveness 
Our final preliminary analysis reexamines prior research on 
“defensiveness” that was conducted by Long and Christensen in 2013.94 
The basic theory underlying Long and Christensen’s analysis is that 
people broadcast weakness through their use of language, and in particular 
through specific “defensive” forms of speech, including the use of 
intensifiers, such as the word “clearly,” and more complex semantic 
structure.
95
 
To test whether this theory describes behavior on the Supreme Court, 
Long and Christensen hypothesize that dissents will demonstrate these 
stylistic characteristics more than majority opinions. For their analysis, 
Long and Christensen examined 526 Supreme Court opinions in the years 
2006 and 2007.
96
 They counted the intensifiers in majority and dissenting 
opinions as a percentage of total words.
97
 For their measure of complexity 
of semantic structure, they relied on the familiar Flesch-Kincaid reading 
“grade level” score.98 Flesch-Kincaid reading grade levels are based on the 
average number of words per sentence and average number of syllables 
per word—increasing numbers of either raises the grade level.99 Long and 
Christensen found a significant increase in the use of intensifiers in 
dissenting opinions, but found that the grade level scores were actually 
higher in majority opinions, although that finding was not statistically 
significant.
100
  
We re-ran the analysis from Long and Christensen on our larger dataset 
to see how well their findings held up. For every Justice who filed at least 
one majority opinion and one dissent, an average grade level and 
intensifier percentage was developed for that Justice’s majority opinions 
and dissenting opinions.
101
 Tracking Long and Christensen, we found that 
majority opinions had somewhat higher grade levels, but that difference 
 
 
 94. See Long & Christensen, supra note 66. 
 95. Id. at 935–36. 
 96. Id. at 948 & n.70 (the majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions were drawn from 266 
decisions issued between February 21, 2006, and June 28, 2007).  
 97. Id. at 949 fig.1 (illustrating “intensifier rates” per 1,000 words). 
 98. Id. at 948–49.  
 99. See id. at 943 n.40. 
 100. Id. at 950. 
 101. There were a total of ninety-nine observations. As before, Justices Blair, Iredell, and Thomas 
Johnson were excluded because they authored no majority opinions. There were seven Justices who 
did not author any dissenting opinions (Chief Justices John Jay, John Rutledge, Oliver Ellsworth, and 
Salmon Chase, and Justices William Cushing, Thomas Todd, and James Byrnes).  
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was not statistically significant.
102
 More interestingly, there was a marked 
time trend in the sophistication of writing (as measured by grade level), 
with more recent Justices writing at lower grade level.
103
 The time trend 
analysis is presented in Figure 4.  
 
FIGURE 4: GRADE LEVEL BY MEDIAN YEAR  
 
 
 
From this analysis, it appears that the Court has generally reduced the 
complexity of its language (as measured by Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level) 
over time.
104
 This finding runs contrary to the findings of Johnson’s 
examination of grade level trends using a smaller sample: cases written 
during the 1931–1933 and 2009–2011 terms.105 Johnson found that writing 
complexity, and Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level specifically, had increased 
over time. A glance at Figure 4 reveals that there is variability around the 
general time trend toward lower grade level scores, making any inference 
 
 
 102. A Student’s t-test was used to determine whether there was a statistically significant 
difference in means for either grade level or intensifier use. See CHARLES HENRY BRASE & CORRINNE 
PELLILLO BRASE, UNDERSTANDABLE STATISTICS 479 (11th ed. 2014).  
 103. To develop a single grade level for each Justice’s writings, we averaged the grade level for 
their dissents and majority opinions.  
 104. An OLS regression returned an R-squared value of 0.4 and a p-value of less than 0.01%. The 
coefficient was -0.03.  
 105. See Johnson, supra note 67, at 57–58 (finding that the Court’s 2009–2011 opinions were 
written at about a grade level higher on the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level scale than the Court’s 1931–
1933 opinions). 
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of a general time trend from limited data difficult. Of course, the actual 
grade level comparison between the two temporal sets made by Johnson 
remains valid, even if it does not appear to be representative of a longer 
and more general time trend.  
It should be noted that Flesch-Kincaid scores have been criticized as a 
measure of sophistication and complexity.
106
 A general time trend toward 
lower grade level does not necessarily mean that the Court’s reasoning is 
less sophisticated, or that its writing is of lower quality. Good writing does 
not necessarily involve long words or long sentences.
107
 An interesting 
question for future research would be whether the trend toward lower 
complexity in the Court’s writings is mirrored in broader social trends, or 
marks a trend toward more vernacular writing that is more closely in line 
with non-judicial writing styles. 
We also also confirmed Long and Christensen’s findings on intensifier 
use.
108
 There was a markedly higher use of intensifiers in dissents, with 
means of 0.12% of words for majority opinions and 0.18% for dissents, a 
statistically significant difference.
109
 Unlike friendliness and grade level, 
there was no obvious time trend in intensifier use—it appears that 
intensifiers have been used at roughly similar rates across the data.  
C. The Stylistic Fingerprint and Similarity Scores 
Our stylistic analysis moves beyond attempts to measure specific 
stylistic features of writing, and instead relies on a measure that is meant 
to serve as a broad proxy for a range of stylistic characteristics: the use of 
function words.  
Function words play a special role in language and remain stable over 
time.
110
 Content words, on the other hand, are constantly added. For 
example, the 2014 update to Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
includes “hashtag,” “selfie,” and “crowdfunding”—all very much content 
words.
111
 Function words can often be very short, such as “I, the, a, of,” 
 
 
 106. Id. at 50–51.  
 107. See generally George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, 13 HORIZON 252 (1946) 
(criticizing use of overly stylized and dehumanizing language in political discourse).  
 108. See Long & Christensen, supra note 66, at 950. 
 109. The p-value was less than .01%. 
 110. ADRIAN AKMAJIAN, RICHARD A. DEMERS, ANN K. FARMER & ROBERT M. HARNISH, 
LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 21 (4th ed. 1995) (discussing 
function words). 
 111. Katy Steinmetz, # Selfie, Steampunk, Catfish: See This Year’s New Dictionary Words, TIME 
(May 19, 2014), http://time.com/103503/merriam-webster-dictionary-selfie-catfish/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/QCC2-6DYF. 
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while content words are rarely as short. There also appear to be 
neurological differences between function and content words. Function 
words are acquired by children later than content words, and specific types 
of neurological injuries can lead to a loss of use of function words, while 
content words remain accessible.
112
 Various neurological studies have 
found that function and content words are stored and processed in different 
brain regions.
113
 For purposes of the following analysis, the most 
important characteristic of function words is that they have been found to 
provide a source for the development of a useful stylistic “fingerprint” that 
can be used for author attribution, and we therefore use it as a proxy for 
writing style more generally.
114
  
Our study relies on 307 standard function words (or “content-free 
words” or “CFWs”) listed in Table 2. The individual occurrences of each 
CFW for each author are aggregated and normalized so that the 
components sum to one.
115
 These normalized vectors are the feature 
vectors for each author.
116
 In their normalized form, they also represent 
probability distributions (their components are nonnegative and they sum 
to one). To construct feature vectors, the relevant corpus was identified, 
such as all writings associated with a Justice, the writings of a Justice in a 
given year, or all of the writings of all of the Justices in a given year. A 
Python script was used to count each of the CFWs and output the feature 
vectors into a simple text format. 
 
 
 112. See Lise Menn & Loraine K. Obler, Cross-Language Data and Theories of Agrammatism, in 
3 AGRAMMATIC APHASIA: A CROSS-LANGUAGE NARRATIVE SOURCEBOOK 1369, 1370, 1388 n.5 
(Lise Menn & Loraine K. Obler eds., 1990).  
 113. See, e.g., Jonathan W. King & Marta Kutas, A Brain Potential Whose Latency Indexes the 
Length and Frequency of Words, CRL NEWSLETTER (Ctr. for Res. in Language, UCSD, San Diego, 
CA), Nov. 1995, at 1, 1.  
 114. See HFKR (2012), supra note 7, at 7682. In their study of clerk influence on the Supreme 
Court, Rosenthal and Yoon use sixty-three function words. Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, 
Detecting Multiple Authorship of United States Supreme Court Legal Decisions Using Function 
Words, 5 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 283, 287 (2011). 
 115. We normalized the values by dividing by the L1-norm, which is the sum of the absolute 
values of the components of the vector. HFKR (2012), supra note 7, at 7683.  
 116. Wikipedia provides the following useful definition of a feature vector: “In pattern recognition 
and machine learning, a feature vector is an n-dimensional vector of numerical features that represent 
some object.” Feature Vector, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feature_vector (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/V5R6-JK89. In essence, our stylistic feature vectors are a 
string of 307 numbers that are the relative frequency of the 307 content free words within the relevant 
group of writings. As relative frequencies, these vectors also represent probability distributions.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/6
  
 
 
 
 
2016] WRITING STYLE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1485 
 
 
 
 
The degree of difference between two probability distributions can be 
measured as the Kullback-Leibler (“KL”) divergence. KL divergence is a 
standard measure for comparing distributions, and it has been used in prior 
studies of the evolution of writing style.
117
 Following convention, we use a 
symmetrized version of KL divergence that is the average of the KL 
divergences of A with respect to B and B with respect to A.
118
 The KL 
divergence is then scaled to generate a similarity score between zero and 
one. 
It is important to reiterate that our stylistic fingerprint is not meant to 
capture the totality of judicial writing style. It would be strange indeed to 
claim that the frequency with which Justice Holmes used the word “it” 
accounts for the claim by Judge Posner—nearly a century later—that the 
dissenting opinion in Lochner is a “rhetorical masterpiece.”119 Instead, the 
 
 
 117. HFKR (2012), supra note 7, at 7683. For an introduction to KL divergence in the context of 
natural language processing, see CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING & HINRICH SCHUTZE, FOUNDATIONS OF 
STATISTICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 39–80 (1999). Note that to avoid undefined division 
by zero, we add .0001 to all of the components in all of the feature vectors, regardless of whether a 
word was used. This technique is called “smoothing” and will always result in an increase in our 
similarity score when compared to the unsmoothed version. 
 118. Hereinafter, when we refer to using the KL divergence we implicitly mean in this 
symmetrized form. 
 119. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351, 1383 
(1986).  
TABLE 2: CONTENT-FREE WORDS 
 
a about above across after afterwards again against all almost alone along already also although 
always am among amongst amoungst amount an and another any anyhow anyone anything 
anyway anywhere are around as at back be became because become becomes becoming been 
before beforehand behind being below beside besides between beyond both bottom but by call 
can cannot cant con could couldnt cry describe detail do done down due during each eight either 
eleven else elsewhere empty enough etc even ever every everyone everything everywhere except 
few fifteen fifty fill find fire first five for former formerly forty found four from front full further 
get give go had has hasnt have he hence her here hereafter hereby herein hereupon hers herself 
him himself his how however hundred ie if in inc indeed into is it its itself keep last latter latterly 
least less ltd made many may me meanwhile might mine more moreover most mostly move 
much must my myself name namely neither never nevertheless next nine no nobody none noone 
nor not nothing now nowhere of off often on once one only onto or other others otherwise our 
ours ourselves out over own part per perhaps please put rather re same see seem seemed seeming 
seems serious several she should show side since six sixty so some somehow someone something 
sometime sometimes somewhere still such take ten than that the their them themselves then 
thence there thereafter thereby therefore therein thereupon these they thin third this those though 
three through throughout thru thus to together too top toward towards twelve twenty two under 
until up upon us very via was we well were what whatever when whence whenever where 
whereafter whereas whereby wherein whereupon wherever whether which while whither who 
whoever whole whom whose why will with within without would yet you your yours yourself 
yourselves 
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feature vector is meant to serve as a proxy for the larger set of stylistic 
characteristics that distinguish one writer from another. 
There are other potential measures of style. For example, the LitStats 
software mentioned above reports statistics on eight specific stylistic 
factors: average footnote length, average sentence length, average word 
length, word length diversity, sentence length diversity, footnote 
frequency, type-token ratio,
120
 and the once-word rate.
121
 These factors 
have been used in analysis of juridical writings.
122
 Alternatively, scholars 
have looked to compression software to generate a measure for similarity 
between writings.
123
 All of these methods are plausible, and there is no 
consensus on a dominant quantitative methodology for quantitative 
measurement of style.
124
 The stylistic measure used in this study has the 
advantage of simplicity, and it is commonly used in both forensic and 
literary attribution work.
125
 
III. TIME TRENDS IN JUDICIAL STYLE 
This Part applies the methodology just described to examine how 
writing style on the Court changes over time. Specifically, we ask whether 
there is a “style of the time,” in the sense that contemporaneous Justices 
tend to write more similarly than Justices who are temporally remote from 
one another. As will be clear from the analysis below, the answer to that 
question is “yes.”  
To undertake our analysis of the relationship between temporal 
distance and writing style similarity, we first calculated feature vectors for 
all Justices and created similarity scores for every Justice-pair within the 
study period. Each Justice was also assigned a place in time, based on the 
mid-point of their term on the Court.
126
  
 
 
 120. The type-token ratio is “the number of different words in an opinion (types) as a percentage 
of the total number of words in the opinion (tokens).” Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Lee 
Sigelman, Ghostwriters on the Court? A Stylistic Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Drafts, 30 
AM. POL. RES. 166, 176 (2002). 
 121. The once-word rate is “the relative frequency of words that appear exactly once in an 
opinion.” Id. (listing and explaining the eight stylistic factors). 
 122. See id. 
 123. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (And Should We 
Care?), 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1105 (2005). The greater the rate of compression, the greater the 
assumed stylistic consistency. Id. 
 124. See id. at 1105 nn.82–83 (noting different statistical approaches to attributing authorship and 
citing relevant scholarship). 
 125. See HFKR (2012), supra note 7, at 7682.  
 126. For Justices serving at the end of the study period, we used the last year as the end of their 
term.  
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Our first analysis is a representation of similarity scores as a style 
“network” with Justices “linked” to each other based on stylistic 
similarity. In the terminology of network analysis, the Justices are “nodes” 
and a thresholding technique on the stylistic similarity is used to determine 
when “edges” (or links) are placed between the nodes.127 Each Justice is a 
node in the network, and an edge was created between that Justice and the 
5% of other Justices with the highest similarity scores in their set.
128
 We 
then undertake a quantitative estimate of groups within the style network, 
using the methodology of spectral clustering analysis.
129
 Boyd, Hoffman, 
Obradovic, and Ristovski describe a use of the spectral clustering 
methodology, which is a technique used to “classify and group” items 
within a dataset.
130
 In essence, spectral clustering “cuts” a network into 
some defined number of groups (i.e., accomplishes a “clustering”), relative 
to the condition that similarity between members of the groups should be 
relatively high and the similarity between members of different groups 
relatively low.
131
 A related (and often thorny) problem in spectral 
clustering is the determination of the number of clusters as based on the 
data.
132
 We did not address that second problem—which is not necessary 
to our analysis—and instead set the number of clusters to be identified at 
seventeen, which is the number of Chief Justices that have served on the 
Court. That number is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, but it is sufficient 
for our purposes, which is generally to examine whether Justices’ writing 
styles appear to cluster together on a temporal basis. The groups generated 
by the spectral clustering analysis are ordered by the median year of the 
 
 
 127. Nicholas J. Foti, James M. Hughes & Daniel N. Rockmore, Nonparametric Sparsification of 
Complex Multiscale Networks, 6 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2011), available at http://journals.plos.org/ 
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0016431. 
 128. If the edge already exists (because it was added when a previous Justice was considered), it 
was not added again, but a new edge was not moved into the top 5% to replace it. Three Justices are 
excluded from the graph based on a lack of similarity to any other Justice: Chief Justice John 
Rutledge, Justice Moore, and Justice Thomas Johnson. 
 129. See generally Ulrike Von Luxburg, A Tutorial on Spectral Clustering, 17 STAT. & 
COMPUTING 395 (2007), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11222-007-9033-z. 
 130. See Christina L. Boyd, David A. Hoffman, Zoran Obradovic & Kosta Ristovski, Building a 
Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 253, 262–64 (2013). See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1383 (2009), and Corey Rayburn Yung, A Typology of Judging Styles, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1757 
(2013), as other examples of cluster analysis in empirical legal studies. 
 131. Boyd, Hoffman, Obradovic & Ristovski, supra note 130, at 263. In Appendix B, Boyd et al. 
provide an example of a general spectral clustering algorithm, similar to the program used in our 
analysis. Id. at 285–87.  
 132. See generally Asa Ben-Hur, Andre Elisseeff & Isabelle Guyon, A Stability Based Method for 
Discovering Structure in Clustered Data, 17 PAC. SYMP. ON BIOCOMPUTING 6 (2002) (describing a 
method for determing the “optimal number of clusters”). 
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Justices in the cluster, and the range of median years is presented 
alongside the group as well. Table 3 presents the results from the spectral 
clustering analysis.
133
 
 
TABLE 3: SPECTRAL CLUSTERING ANALYSIS 
ID Yr/Rg        
1 1812 Blair Jay Johnson_T Wilson Iredell Rutledge_J  
 78 1792 1792 1793 17945 1795 1795  
  Ellsworth Cushing Paterson Moore Todd Duvall  
  1798 1800 1800 1802 1816.5 1823  
  Woodbury Chase_Salmon Clifford     
  1848 1869 1870     
2 1837 Washington Johnson_W Trimble Thompson Barbour Daniel Story 
 65 1813.5 1819 1827 1833 1838.5 1851 1879 
3 1842 Livingston Marshall_J Baldwin Curtis Grier Davis  
 55 1815 1818 1837 1854 1858 1870  
4 1848 Mclean Catron      
 6 1845 1851      
5 1853 Mckinley Taney Campbell Nelson    
 14 1844.5 1850 1857 1858.5    
6 1875 Wayne Miller Bradley Waite Woods   
 33 1851 1876 1881 1881 1884   
7 1890 Field Matthews Lamar_L Gray Harlan_I Jackson_H Shiras 
 18 1880 1885 1891 1892 1894 1894 1898 
8 1891 Swayne Strong Hunt Brown Brewer Peckham Mckenna 
 40 1872 1875 1878 1899 1900 1903 1912 
9 1892 Chase_Samuel Lamar_J Holmes Cardozo    
 132 1804 1914 1917 1935    
10 1893 Blatchford Fuller      
 12 1888 1899      
11 1919 White_E Moody Lurton Day Pitney Mcreynolds  
 30 1908 1908 1912 1913 1917 1928  
  Sutherland Roberts_O      
  1930 1938      
12 1926 Clarke Vandevanter Hughes Taft Sanford Brandeis Butler 
 12 1919 1924 1925.5 1926 1927 1928 1931 
13 1948 Stone Byrnes Murphy Reed Vinson Burton  
 24 1936 1942 1945 1947.5 1950 1952  
  Minton Whittaker      
  1953 1960      
14 1954 Rutledge_W Jackson_R Frankfurter Black Douglas Fortas  
 21 1946 1948 1951 1954 1957 1967  
15 1961 Clark Warren Harlan_Ii Goldberg    
 6 1958 1961 1963 1964    
16 1980 Stewart Brennan Burger White_B Marshall_T Powell  
 22 1970 1973 1978 1978 1979 1980  
  Blackmun Rehnquist Stevens     
  1982 1989 1992     
17 2000 O’Connor Scalia Kennedy Souter Thomas Ginsburg  
 14 1994 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  
  Breyer Roberts_J Alito     
  2001 2007 2007     
  
 
 
 133. A representation of the network is available as a supplemental online figure at 
https://math.dartmouth.edu/images/screenshot_103919.png.  
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The most striking observation from these analyses is the degree to 
which Justices are more stylistically similar to their contemporaries than to 
temporally distant Justices. This is especially the case in the modern era, 
with the Justices on the current Court quite isolated stylistically from 
Justices in earlier years, which can be seen quite clearly in the 
supplemental online figure. In general, the spectral clustering analysis 
displayed in Table 3 created groups that were time-based, with temporal 
ranges of a few decades, and some closer to a single decade.
134
  
To analyze more closely the relationship between time and stylistic 
similarity, we characterized every Justice by the median year of his or her 
term of service on the Court. For sitting Justices (including Justice Scalia), 
2008 was used as the end of their tenure. We then calculated the distance 
in time for every pair of Justices, and related those distances to the 
similarity score for those Justices. The results are presented in Figure 5.  
FIGURE 5: SIMILARITY SCORES BETWEEN JUSTICES,  
AS A FUNCTION OF TIME 
  
 
 
 134. The outlier groups are 9 and 1, which have somewhat larger ranges.  
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An OLS regression generated an R-squared of 0.18 and a p-value of 
less than 0.01%, and a coefficient for temporal distance of 0.047.
135
 These 
findings can be interpreted as indicating that, while there are sources of 
variation in the data other than time, there is also a strong trend of 
declining similarity in time, with a rate of decay in similarity score of 
roughly 4–5%. As Justices move farther apart in time, they become 
increasingly distinct in their writing styles. 
To examine the influence of time from a somewhat different angle, we 
next calculated feature vectors for all years and created similarity scores 
for every year pair within our study period. We then calculated average 
similarity scores based on temporal distance: one-year distant pairs were 
averaged into a single similarity score; two-year distant pairs were 
averaged into a second; and so on. The average similarity score for 
temporally matched pairs is represented in Figure 6.  
FIGURE 6: AVERAGE SIMILARITY AND TEMPORAL DISTANCE 
  
 
 
 135. Similarity scores were normalized with a natural log transformation.  
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Overall, these results indicate a decline in the similarity of year feature 
vectors as they move farther apart in time, with a rate of decay in 
similarity of around 4–5%.136 This analysis again provides strong evidence 
that style on the Court is not time independent, but instead changes over 
time. The writings of Justices working together in a given decade are far 
more stylistically similar to each other than they are to writings of Justices 
on a temporally remote Court.  
IV. POTENTIAL MECHANISMS 
The foregoing analysis raises an interesting question as to why stylistic 
similarity within judicial writing declines with temporal distance between 
Justices. There are a variety of potential mechanisms that could cause 
writing style to change with time. When examining the Court, it is perhaps 
most natural to look to external factors, including broader societal trends 
in writing style. Questions surrounding change of writing style on the 
Court, then, would necessarily implicate a larger set of questions 
concerning change of writing style outside the Court in various media, 
including literature, popular culture, and personal communication.
137
 
Those questions, while no doubt of interest, are outside the scope of this 
project. 
We restrict our analysis to internal factors that could help explain a 
change in style. In this Part, we examine three potential causal 
mechanisms. The first is influence by highly respected prior decisions. We 
do not find convincing evidence that more frequently cited prior decisions 
exert any particularly great influence on later style. We then examine 
changes in the Court’s composition and do not find evidence that the 
partisan affiliation of Justices has an effect on style. Finally, we examine 
the potential influence of substance by comparing dissenting and majority 
opinions and find some evidence that writing style bears some relationship 
to opinion type.  
 
 
 136. The coefficient for temporal distance is -0.04 in an OLS regression of the natural log; the p-
value is less than .01%. The R-squared for this analysis is 0.92, reflecting the reduction in noise due to 
the averaging procedure.  
 137. Cf. HFKR (2012), supra note 7, at 7684–85 (examining writing style in literary texts). It is 
worth noting that a “style of the time” appears to exist across textual domains; both in literature, where 
novelty and innovation are prized, as well as in judicial writing, which is, at least arguably, more 
formal and formulaic.  
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A. Prior Decisions 
The first mechanism that we examine is the possibility of a causal role 
played by influential past decisions. Just as past decisions generate legal 
standards and norms of judicial reasoning, they serve as the backdrop 
against which a Justice’s writing style is perceived. While some 
innovation in writing style may be rewarded, Justices are likely to express 
some degree of conformity to prevailing conventions. Justices may also 
consciously model their writing style on prior Justices who they find to be 
particularly worthy of emulation, or may be subconsciously influenced by 
the decisions that they read. 
To test for the influence of prior Justices, we rely on the current Court 
as our baseline. To create the baseline, we used the writings of each of the 
currently sitting Justices in our dataset (Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, 
Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas) to generate a single stylistic feature 
vector.
138
 We then excluded from our analysis all of the Justices who 
served at the same time with any sitting Justice as a way to separate out 
any cross-influence between Justices and ensure that the causal 
relationship runs in the anticipated direction. For each remaining Justice, 
we constructed a feature vector for their writing, and calculated the KL 
divergence between that feature vector and the current Court baseline.  
For each Justice in the analysis, we then constructed a “ghost” vector 
made up of the texts produced by the Court in each of their years on the 
bench, excluding that Justice’s writings.139 We calculated the KL 
divergence between the ghost vectors and the current Court baseline 
vector. Finally, we subtracted the KL divergence for each Justice’s ghost 
vector from their KL divergence to generate what we call “prediction 
scores”: a difference less than zero indicated that a Justice’s writing was 
more similar to the current Court’s style than to the other writings of the 
Court in the years when that Justice was on the bench. Justices who 
perform well tend to “predict” the current style of the Court better than 
Justices who perform poorly (with lower numbers associated with better 
prediction). There were few Justices with prediction scores of less than 
zero, because each Justice typically authors only a small fraction of cases 
 
 
 138. At the time of our analysis, Justice Scalia was an active member of the Court.  
 139. For this analysis, we use a smaller list of seventy-five non-content words: 
“first between also where who those part than him will could without whether must after 
before within should these only them when against same so one would their there has they 
other all made may if we us he under but been had his were no have are any its upon such at 
an with from on which this not or as for be it was by is a that in and to of the” 
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in a given year, meaning that random sources of variation are much less 
likely to substantially influence the ghost vectors than an individual 
Justice’s vector.  
We then compared the resulting prediction scores to a measure of 
“historical value” for each Justice, which was generated by Kosma in 1998 
based on citation counts.
140
 This variable is meant to capture the 
possibility that Justices who are widely cited exert greater stylistic 
pressure on subsequent Justices. We controlled for the relationship 
between a Justice’s total production, in words, and our prediction scores. 
There are two potential mechanisms for this variable to affect the 
prediction scores. First, Justices that produce a great deal of text contribute 
more to the total body of the law that later Justices read. For that reason, 
perhaps they exert greater stylistic influence. Higher levels of production 
also imply less opportunity for random sources of variability in the use of 
function words to affect a Justice’s feature vector. Finally, we controlled 
for time, to account for temporal effects that are not captured in the ghost 
vector-based normalization, and examine the interaction between 
production and Kosma’s historical value.141  
 
 
 140. See Kosma, supra note 10, at 352 tbl.2. In Kosma’s analysis, Chief Justice Hughes is given 
two different scores, corresponding to the two different stints that he spent on the Court. Id. at 350 
n.39. Because of the lack of correspondence to our single entry for Hughes, we dropped him from both 
sides of the analysis.  
 141. For this analysis, we use the data described above to construct three variables. Hist is based 
on Kosma’s historical value scores, normalized through a cube root function, centering at zero and 
scaled by the standard deviation. Prod is based on total word production, again normalized through a 
cube root function centering at zero and scaled by the standard deviation. Predict is the natural log of 
the prediction scores. We created a fourth variable, Predict1, which is a cube root transformation of 
the prediction scores: the log transformation better normalizes the data but creates difficulties around 
the negative prediction scores. For Predict we dropped the negative observations, which are retained in 
Predict1.  
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TABLE 4: HISTORICAL INFLUENCE  
 Predict Predict Predict Predict1 
Hist -0.488 -0.098 -0.150 -0.033 
 (6.94)** (0.53) (0.83) (1.22) 
Prod  -0.414 -0.293 -0.020 
  (2.27)* (1.48) (0.66) 
Year   0.000 0.000 
   (0.10) (0.78) 
Hist*Prod   0.242 0.036 
   (3.55)** (3.44)** 
_cons -4.074 -4.071 -4.609 -0.171 
 (58.46)** (59.82)** (1.41) (0.34) 
Adj.-R2 0.36 0.40 0.49 0.34 
N 87 87 87 91 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, t statistic in parentheses 
 
Historical value is significant in the first specification as a standalone 
variable. It drops out of significance in the second model, which includes 
production. In the full model, the interaction term is significant.
142
 Recall 
that lower prediction scores imply greater similarity. To interpret the 
interaction, we examined the effects of historical value at different levels 
of production, finding that historical value is significant at production 
levels less than one standard deviation below the mean, where it improves 
(i.e., lowers) prediction scores.
143
  
What to make of this analysis? Justices at the lowest level of 
productivity have poor prediction scores, and their prediction scores 
improve as they become more productive. Our analysis cannot determine 
whether that effect is from a reduction in statistical noise or a greater 
likelihood that a future Justice read and internalized their writing style. 
Among the lower productivity Justices, authoring more highly cited 
opinions appears to improve their prediction scores. For Justices at higher 
levels of productivity, we do not find that additional citation contributes to 
greater stylistic similarity with future Justices.   
 
 
 142. Note that this is true for both the logarithmic and the cube root transformations of prediction 
scores. The lack of significance for Hist and Prod in the full model indicates that, at the mean value of 
Prod, Hist is not significant, and vice versa.  
 143. This is the case for both the logarithmic and the cube root transformations of prediction 
scores. See generally A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, MICROECONOMETRICS USING STATA 
343–57 (2010) (discussing calculation of marginal effects).  
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B. Partisan Affiliation  
We next examine the possibility that writing style is associated with 
some other set of cognitive, ideological, value-based, or perceptive 
characteristics, and that the change in writing style over time on the Court 
reflects a broader shift in Weltanschauung.
144
 This type of relationship is 
hard to test, for obvious reasons, but we conduct a very general analysis by 
examining whether there is any systematic stylistic difference between 
Justices appointed by Presidents of different parties.  
We only test differences between the contemporary Democratic and 
Republican parties, and so restrict our analysis to the latter half of the 
twentieth century.
145
 Looking over the entire study period, there is 
somewhat less similarity between Democratic-appointed Justices and 
Republican-appointed Justices than within the party groupings. However, 
there is an obvious temporal problem, because the relative representation 
of the two parties on the Court has shifted markedly over time.  
To account for this feature in the data, we compare the inter- and intra-
party difference for each year, starting in 1955. We generate a feature 
vector for the texts authored by the Justices appointed by Republican and 
Democratic Presidents and calculate a similarity score between them. This 
analysis is done for each year starting in 1955. For each party, we then 
subdivide the opinions, randomly, into two test groups and generate 
feature vectors for the test groups. Finally, we calculate similarity scores 
for the feature vectors for the same-party test groups, and then average the 
two scores (Democratic and Republican) to generate a measure of intra-
party distance. The hypothesis is that the inter-party similarity scores will 
be lower than the intra-party scores.  
On average, the similarity scores were a shade higher for the inter-
party group (contrary to the hypothesis). We also conducted a very simple 
additional test by computing similarity scores for “parties” generated by 
 
 
 144. On the relationship of writing style with other cognitive or ideological factors on the Court, 
see Deborah H. Gruenfeld, Status, Ideology, and Integrative Complexity on the U.S. Supreme Court: 
Rethinking the Politics of Political Decision Making, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1995); 
Tetlock, Bernzweig & Gallant, supra note 48. 
 145. We use the dawn of the FDR coalition as the point at which the contemporary meaning of 
“Democrat” and “Republican” take shape. Although there is some controversy over the meaning of 
“realignment” elections and their relationship to party systems. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, 
ELECTORAL REALIGNMENTS (2002) (arguing that realignment elections are overemphasized by 
political scientists). There is enough data to generate inter- and intra-party similarities for post-1932 
appointees starting in the mid-1950s. 
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random assignment of opinions for each year.
146
 The actual similarity 
scores were somewhat lower—both inter- and intra-party—compared to 
randomly generated groupings. There is no clear interpretation for this 
feature of the data, but it does not provide particular evidence that partisan 
affiliation is associated with stylistic difference.  
To account for the possibility that writing style has become more 
polarized over the course of our dataset (as the parties have polarized) we 
examined whether there was any time trend toward increasing 
dissimilarity between inter- and intra-party similarity scores. We found a 
very mild time trend toward greater dissimilarity, but time accounted for 
very little of the variation and the trend was not statistically significant.
147
 
Overall, for this relatively small portion of the dataset (53 years), we did 
not find evidence that differences between the parties account for changes 
in judicial writing style over time. 
C. Substantive Factors 
We also examined the degree of difference between opinion types 
(dissenting and majority opinions) compared to the degree of divergence 
within opinion type. For this analysis, we eliminated pre-1950 texts, when 
dissenting opinions were relatively rare. We then randomly separated 
majority opinions into two groups and dissenting opinions into two 
groups, and calculated the KL divergence between the feature vectors 
constructed between those two groups. As expected, given the large 
number of texts in each group, the KL divergence was quite small.
148
 We 
then examined the differences between majority and dissenting opinions 
and found that the KL divergence for these groupings was two orders of 
magnitude higher.
149
 This is a statistically significant result.
150
 
To account for the possibility that the growing number of dissents 
combined with general stylistic trends caused these differences, we 
constructed corpora of dissents and majority opinions for each Justice, and 
conducted the same within-group and between-group analyses. Because 
their groups were smaller, there was greater opportunity for random 
 
 
 146. See MAX KUHN & KJELL JOHNSON, APPLIED PREDICTIVE MODELING 69–73 (2013) 
(discussing techniques used to test model efficacy).  
 147. The R-squared value was 0.02, and the p-value was 38%.  
 148. The KL divergence was 0.00026 for dissenting opinions, and 0.00011 for majority opinions.  
 149. Majority1-Dissent1, 0.011; Majority1-Dissent2, 0.010; Majority2-Dissent1, 0.011; 
Majority2-Dissent2, 0.010. 
 150. An analysis on simulated groupings showed that the likelihood of randomly generating such 
a difference between similarly sized groups was well below 0.01%. 
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variation to affect the feature vectors, and the KL divergences were greater 
in general.
151
 We also examined the KL divergence between majority and 
dissenting opinions, finding that there was not the same order of 
magnitude difference, but that there were statistically significant 
differences between the mean KL divergences.
152
  
The bottom line of this analysis is that there does appear to be a 
difference in writing style between dissents and majority opinions, even 
for the same Justice. One potential source of temporal variation in writing 
style, then, may be the growing prevalence of dissents on the Court.
153
 
Given that this particular form of judicial writing appears to be stylistically 
distinct, its growth in popularity may account for some of the temporal 
drift in writing style on the Court.  
V. CLERK INFLUENCE 
As judicial clerks have become an enduring feature of the operation of 
the federal courts, the role of these recent law graduates has been the 
subject of both scholarly and public debate.
154
 An important empirical 
predicate to this debate is the belief that clerks play a substantial role in 
authoring opinions.
155
 At least for the Supreme Court, there is a long 
 
 
 151. The average KL divergence between majority opinions was 0.011; the average KL 
divergence between dissenting opinions was 0.05. 
 152. The average KL divergence between opinion types, for all groups (majority1-dissent1; 
majority2-dissent1; majority1-dissent2; majority2-dissent2), for all Justices was .04. We conducted a t-
test on the difference in means between the KL divergence within majority opinions and between 
opinion types, and the difference in means between the KL divergence within dissenting opinions and 
between opinions types. Both were significant (p<0.01%). It is interesting to note that, for dissents, the 
average KL divergence within type was greater than the average KL divergence between majority and 
dissenting opinions. This seems to indicate that there is quite substantial stylistic variation within 
dissenting opinions of the same Justice.  
 153. Our tests of concurrences found that they had half the KL divergence from majority decisions 
as dissents; also, it is possible the majority writings have begun to take on the tone of earlier dissents, 
such as being more argumentative.  
 154. See, e.g., TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) (discussing role of clerks on the Court); ARTEMUS WARD 
& DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2006) (same). The debate is longstanding. See, e.g., Chester Newland, Personal 
Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299 (1961) (early article 
discussing role of law clerks). For discussion of the effects of clerks on judicial writing style, see 
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 347–51 
(1993) (criticizing “the rise, to a position of previously unimaginable influence, of law clerks”); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 146 (1996) (speculating that 
the reliance of judges on clerks may lead to longer opinions).  
 155. The effect of clerks on the selection of cases is also important. Research on this element of 
clerk influence has typically assumed that clerks act as more or less faithful agents for their hiring 
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history of anecdotal evidence supporting the claim that law clerks exert 
some influence over judicial decision-making.
156
 There is also a nascent 
literature that uses quantitative techniques to address the question of clerk 
influence over both substance and style. This Part investigates whether the 
stylistic measures discussed above can provide insights into whether clerks 
have had a measurable effect on writing style on the Court.
157
  
A. Previous Studies  
The question of clerk influence over opinion drafting has been the 
subject of several attempts at computational content analysis. Before 
moving to our analysis, we briefly review that literature and its findings. 
A paper by Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Sigelman in 2002 is the first 
attempt (to our knowledge) to use computational text analysis to address 
the question of clerk authorship.
158
 That analysis relied on seventy-one 
opinions during the 1985 term that were authored by Justices Powell and 
Marshall.
159
 The authors identify the clerks most likely to have assisted 
drafting each opinion, based on Justice Powell’s records (for Powell’s 
clerks) and the identity of the clerk who authored the bench memo on the 
case (for Marshall’s clerks).160 There were nine clerks in the study 
period.
161
 The authors analyzed the seventy-one opinions using LitStats 
1.62, a software package that conducts basic analysis of digital textual 
information.
162
 The authors analyzed eight stylistic features of the texts, 
including average word length, average sentence length, footnote 
 
 
Justice. See Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, The Role of Law Clerks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Agenda-Setting Process, 40 AM. POL. RES. 147, 150–52 (2012). 
 156. For an early popular exchange on the subject, compare William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes 
Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1957, at 74–75 (raising 
concern about the role of clerks, especially with respect to their role in certiorari decisions), with 
William D. Rogers, Clerks’ Work is “Not Decisive of Ultimate Result,” U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Feb. 21, 1958, at 114–16 (disputing claim of strong clerk influence), and William H. Rehnquist, 
Another View: Clerks Might “Influence” Some Actions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 21, 1958, at 
116 (reasserting potential influence of clerks). 
 157. Of course, even if clerks authored opinions, they are not necessarily able to influence 
substantive outcomes. Nevertheless, the ability to influence style may be indicative of substantive 
influence, and the question of stylistic influence is interesting in its own right.  
 158. See Wahlbeck, Spriggs & Sigelman, supra note 120. 
 159. See id. at 175. In analysis of clerkship influence over judicial opinions, the question of 
“authorship” is, to some extent, the object of study. By convention, we refer to the Justice under whose 
name an opinion appears as the “author” throughout this Article. 
 160. Id. at 174. 
 161. Id. at 175. 
 162. Id. at 176. 
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frequency, and footnote length.
163
 The authors then calculated a simple 
measure of similarity for the stylistic features between two texts, and 
estimated the predicted similarity for each of the nine clerks.
164
 The 
authors concluded that “Powell’s clerks displayed less autonomy than 
Marshall’s,” a finding that they found was consistent with anecdotal 
accounts of the two Justices’ work habits.165 
Choi and Gulati, writing in 2005, rely on the GZip compression 
software, which “compresses documents based on the similarities in the 
basic linguistic building blocks of . . . two files.”166 Greater compression 
for a corpus implies that it comprises more similar texts.
167
 The authors 
examine the writings of ninety-eight judges in the federal appellate courts 
that were active in their study period of 1998–2000, drawing four text 
samples of 8,000 characters each for each judge.
168
 The authors rely on 
compressions scores for each two-case pair and construct two different 
measures of consistency to rank judges in their sample.
169
 On neither 
consistency measure, however, do their rankings conform to their ex-ante 
hypothesis that Judges Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and Michael 
 
 
 163. The authors provide the following description of the features in their study: 
1. The type-token ratio. This is the number of different words in an opinion (types) as a 
percentage of the total number of words in the opinion (tokens). For example, the five-word 
sentence “The boy threw the ball” contains four different words (the appears twice), so the 
type-token ratio is 0.80.  
2. Once-words. This is the relative frequency of words that appear exactly once in an opinion. 
For example, in the sentence “The boy threw the big ball and the big man hit it,” the once-
words ratio equals 0.778, because seven of the nine types in the sentence (boy, threw, ball, 
and, man, hit, and it) appear once; the type-token ratio for the same 12-word sentence is 0.75, 
because it contains 9 different words. 
3. Average word length, expressed as the mean number of letters per word in an opinion.  
4. Word length diversity, expressed as the standard deviation of the number of letters per 
word in an opinion.  
5. Average sentence length, expressed as the mean number of words per sentence in an 
opinion. 
6. Sentence length diversity, expressed as the standard deviation of the number of words per 
sentence in an opinion.  
7. Footnote frequency, expressed as the number of footnotes in an opinion per 1,000 words in 
the text of the opinion.  
8. Footnote length, expressed as the total number of words in footnotes as a percentage of the 
total number of words in the text of the opinion. 
Id. at 176–77 (footnote omitted).  
 164. The measure of similarity was simply the differences for each factor, squared and summed. 
See id. at 177–78.  
 165. Id. at 182.  
 166. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 123, at 1105. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 1106. 
 169. Id. at 1107–10. 
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Boudin would have relatively higher consistency scores compared to their 
peers.
170
 The authors also conducted more straightforward analysis on 
rates of self-citation, variance in opinion length, and total opinion 
length.
171
 The results of these analyses more closely accorded with their 
hypotheses that these three judges played a larger role in opinion 
drafting.
172
 
In the course of an analysis of trends in opinion length on the Supreme 
Court, Black and Spriggs examine whether the increased role of clerks has 
played a causal role in a broader trend toward longer opinions.
173
 For their 
study, the authors access “every orally-argued, signed, or per curiam 
majority opinion decided from 1791 to 2005, for a total of 26,715 
opinions,” and then, using a simple program, count the words in each 
opinion.
174
 They divided the study period into four periods: the first, in 
which there were no clerks in the modern sense; the second, which lasted 
from 1886 to 1919, in which clerks acted as “stenographers”; the third, 
from 1920 to 1952, in which clerks “took on the role of an assistant”; and 
the fourth, post-1953, in which “law clerks went from being assistants to 
being something akin to law firm associates.”175 The period typology is 
drawn from Peppers, and we therefore will refer to these time segments as 
“Peppers groups.”176 While the authors do find that “opinions under the 
associate regime . . . are significantly longer than those in any of the 
earlier regimes,”177 the relationship between clerkship regime and opinion 
length disappears when the time-series nature of the data is taken into 
account—the authors find no meaningful effect from clerkship regime that 
is not accounted for in the general increase of opinion length over time.
178
 
The authors also examine opinion length against anecdotal evidence 
concerning how many Justices on the Court relied on clerks for drafting in 
the years 1953–1990. They found that the total number of Justices that 
relied on clerks was not correlated with increased opinion length, once the 
time-series nature of the data was taken into account.
179
  
 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1111–20. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Black & Spriggs, supra note 4, at 638–45. 
 174. Id. at 630. 
 175. Id. at 638–39.  
 176. Id. at 638 n.53 (citing PEPPERS, supra note 154). 
 177. Id. at 639. 
 178. See id. at 640–42 & nn.64–70. 
 179. See id. at 640 fig.4, 642–43. 
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Peppers and Zorn take an alternative quantitative approach to 
measuring clerk influence based on a survey of recent clerks’ partisan 
affiliation.
180
 The authors identified the clerks that served between 1940 
and 2000 and mailed a survey to approximately 1,000 individuals for 
whom addresses could be identified.
181
 The authors received 639 replies, 
and received information on partisan affiliation from 532.
182
 
Unsurprisingly, the authors find a high degree of correlation between the 
party affiliation of a Justice and the clerks that the Justice hires.
183
 Even 
accounting for that high correlation, the authors find that the party 
affiliation of clerks was associated with case outcomes, with Democratic-
affiliated clerks correlated with more liberal case outcomes.
184
 
Rosenthal and Yoon, writing more recently, examine clerk influence on 
opinions in the Supreme Court by testing variability of writing style.
185
 As 
we do in the analysis above, Rosenthal and Yoon use a function word 
approach to identify author style. The authors use a list of sixty-three 
function words for their analysis, and they draw texts from the majority 
opinions in the period 1991–2009.186 The authors then develop several 
statistical tests for variability in an author’s use of the content-free words 
and rank the Justices in their study period. They find that their hypothesis 
that Justice Kennedy has a greater stylistic variability than Justice Scalia 
was confirmed beyond a significance threshold of p<.05.
187
 Rosenthal and 
Yoon also use the content-free word approach to address the problem of 
author attribution, finding that machine learning approaches achieved high 
levels of correct attribution.
188
 Li et al. build on the author attribution 
methodology in a study of unsigned per curiam opinions in the Supreme 
Court.
189
 That analysis was based on a set of content words and word 
phrases that were generated from the data based on predictive power.
190
 
 
 
 180. Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision 
Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 53 (2008). 
 181. Id. at 60. 
 182. Id. at 60, 62.  
 183. See id. at 66 tbl.2.  
 184. Id. at 73 tbl.4. Of course, as the authors note, their findings are correlational, and “offer no 
support for any particular causal model.” Id. at 75. 
 185. Rosenthal & Yoon, supra note 114. The authors also use similar statistical tools for purposes 
of author attribution.  
 186. Id. at 287–88. The text for their analysis was drawn from the Cornell Law School website. Id. 
 187. Id. at 293–94. The authors suspect that an author’s increased variability is due to greater 
reliance on clerks. 
 188. Id. at 301.  
 189. Li et al., supra note 47, at 505. 
 190. Id. at 516. 
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Using two separate models, the authors achieve accuracy rates greater than 
75% for known-author cases.
191
  
Sulam uses attribution techniques to measure clerk influence.
192
 The 
author uses the stylistic measures from Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Sigelman 
and generates style profiles for clerks in the period 1986–1993 based on 
the certiorari pool memos authored by those clerks.
193
 The author then 
uses non-opinion writings (such as articles or books) as well as opinions in 
the term prior to the tested term to develop stylistic measures for each 
Justice.
194
 Based on these profiles, Sulam uses an attribution model to 
determine whether opinions in the tested term are more consistent with the 
clerk’s or the Justice’s stylistic profile.195 In nearly all cases, the models 
predict the Justice as the author.
196
 This study also used plagiarism 
software to determine the extent of borrowing from the certiorari pool 
memos, finding that there was relatively little borrowing compared to 
other sources, such as the parties’ briefs and lower court opinions.197  
B. Comparing Inter-Year Variability 
Our analysis expands this prior research. Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and 
Sigelman as well as Rosenthal and Yoon test hypotheses about individual 
Justice pairs based on anecdotal evidence concerning reliance on clerks. 
While both studies reject the null hypotheses about a single Justice-Justice 
pair with a high degree of confidence, it is difficult to extrapolate their 
findings to a more general conclusion about clerk influence. Rosenthal and 
Yoon also find a time trend of increasing variability, which is consistent 
with clerk influence, but they did not test whether clerks, or some other 
time-dependent variable, accounted for the change. Choi and Gulati’s 
computationally intensive test finds no greater stylistic consistency for 
reputed likely author judges; their more straightforward measures are 
loosely commensurate with their anecdotal hypothesis, but the evidence is 
 
 
 191. An incidental finding in their analysis was that Justices have greater intra-year than inter-year 
consistency, a finding that is consistent with clerks having some stylistic influence. Id. at 526. We 
leverage that finding in our analysis of the role of clerks.  
 192. Ian Sulam, Editor in Chief: Opinion Authorship and Clerk Influence on the Supreme Court 
11 (May 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://icsulam.github.io/pdf/EditorInChie 
f.pdf. 
 193. Id. at 13–14. 
 194. Id. at 13. 
 195. Id. at 16.  
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 18 (explaining that the rates of borrowing were: cert pool memo (3.72%); briefs 
(6.6%); lower court opinion (7.24%)).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/6
  
 
 
 
 
2016] WRITING STYLE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1503 
 
 
 
 
not overwhelming. Black and Spriggs find no relationship between clerks 
and opinion length (the only variable that they studied). Peppers and Zorn 
find that clerk ideology has additional predictive value for case outcome, 
but do not establish that clerks causally influence outcomes.
198
 Finally, 
Sulam finds little evidence of clerk influence. The most substantial hint of 
clerk influence over writing style comes from Li et al., but that finding 
was incidental to the authors’ project (which concerned attribution of per 
curiam decisions) and was not explored in detail.
199
 
We focus on variation in writing style and focus specifically on inter-
year stylistic variability. Our model of clerkship influence is different than 
that used by Rosenthal and Yoon and Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Sigelman. 
For those authors, variation is hypothesized to be a consequence of 
different clerks drafting different opinions in a given year. While this may 
well be a source of variation, it is extremely difficult to identify the roles 
of individual clerks, and there are reasons to believe that multiple clerks 
may be involved at some point in the drafting and editing process.
200
 Our 
model differs in its focus on clerk turnover as the source of variability, 
rather than simply the existence of clerks within chambers. One of the 
peculiar features of the contemporary clerkship is that it is so short, 
typically lasting a mere year. We exploit this fact in our inter-year measure 
of variability. In addition, we construct a new measure of the total 
consistency of the Court. This measure examines the writing style 
consistency of the Court as an institution, rather than individual Justices. 
We then compare both of our new measures of consistency to the time 
periods used by Black and Spriggs (the Peppers groups) to determine if the 
changing nature of the clerkship institution has affected either intra-year 
consistency of the Court or inter-year consistency of individual Justices.  
The first measure of variability that we introduce is centroid distance. 
This measure is based on the writings of the entire Court in each year. The 
distance between the feature vector for each text in a given year and the 
remainder of the Court’s writings in that year are computed, and those 
 
 
 198. It is possible, for example, that accounting for the party affiliation of the clerks chosen by 
Supreme Court Justices to work in their chambers adds additional information about the Justice, 
essentially creating a more refined proxy for judicial values and ideology. If that is the case, the clerk 
does not necessarily exert any independent influence.  
 199. The authors of that study found that inter-year variation is greater than intra-year variation in 
writing style, which is consistent with our turnover model of clerk influence. See Li et al., supra note 
47, at 525–26. 
 200. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 120, at 170–72 (discussing Justice Powell’s process).  
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distances are summed for each year.
201
 This provides a measure of how 
tightly clustered the Court’s style is in a given year: the greater the 
centroid distance, the bigger the stylistic “spread.” 
An OLS regression on this data examining the relationship between 
year and centroid distance found that there is a statistically significant 
relationship over the entire period.
202
 Over time, the intra-year consistency 
on the Court has measurably increased. 
To examine whether the overall trend toward greater consistency 
differed as the institution of the modern clerk developed, we conducted a 
structural break test on the data. A structural break is a concept from 
econometrics that is primarily used in time series analysis of 
macroeconomic data.
203
 The point of a structural break analysis is to 
determine whether there has been an underlying shift in the data 
generating mechanisms, such that the distribution of data from the period 
after the “break” is systematically different than the distribution prior to 
the break. For example, the United States economy generates data on 
productivity, employment, and other economic variables. In our analysis, 
the data generating mechanism is the US Supreme Court. The structural 
break analysis is meant to examine whether the variable of interest—intra-
year consistency—exhibited a different relationship to time during the 
periods when clerks played very different roles in chambers. 
We first ran a Chow structural break test, which is a standard tool to 
determine whether there are changes in the relationships between time and 
another variable over different time periods.
204
 For the potential break 
points, we used the Peppers groups. The results of the Chow tests are 
presented in Table 6. 
 
 
 201. For the centroid distance estimate, we use cosine similarity, which, like KL divergence, is a 
representation of distance in a multi-dimensional vector space. See generally Mihalcea, Corley & 
Strapparava, supra note 23 (using cosine similarity as baseline measure to evaluate alternative 
similarity measures in text analysis). To avoid confusion, we take [1 - cosine similarity] as the measure 
of “distance” so that larger distances are associated with greater difference.  
 202. The p-value is less than 0.01% and the R-squared value is 0.5.  
 203. See generally Bruce E. Hansen, The New Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks 
in U.S. Labor Productivity, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (2001). 
 204. See id. at 118; see also Gregory C. Chow, Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in 
Two Linear Regressions, 28 ECONOMETRICA 591 (1960). 
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TABLE 6: CHOW TEST ON CENTROID DISTANCE 
First Period      Second Period F-value P-value 
(1791–1885) (1886–2008) 5.7 <0.01 
(1791–1885) (1886–1919) 6.7 <0.01 
(1886–1919) (1920–1952) 5.5 <0.01 
(1920–1952) (1953–2008) 3.13 <0.05 
(1886–1919) (1920–2008) 16.1 <0.01 
 
The Chow test rejects the null hypothesis that there are no structural 
breaks in the centroid distance data at the Peppers groups dates. We 
conducted two additional tests. The first examines whether there is some 
structural break in the data and estimates the break date.
205
 For this test, we 
did not specify a hypothesized date. The analysis rejected the null 
hypothesis of no structural break.
206
 The estimated break date that was 
returned was 1926, very close to the year that clerks took on a greater 
substantive role, as indicated by the Peppers group transition from 
“stenographers” to “assistants.” We also conducted Wald and likelihood 
ratio-based structural break tests for the three hypothesized break dates of 
1885, 1919, and 1952.
207
 Both tests confirmed breaks at those dates with a 
p-value of less than 0.01.  
To attempt to better estimate the effects of clerks specifically, we 
develop a new measure of writing consistency, focused exclusively on 
inter-year variability in writing style. For purposes of our analysis, a 
chamber in a given year can be thought of as a “team” made up of a 
Justice and several clerks. A team co-produces the opinions in a given 
year. When clerks turn over, it changes the composition of the team. In 
chambers with a larger number of clerks that turn over more frequently, 
there will be a higher percentage of team turnover from year to year. 
Although some inter-year stylistic variability can be expected even with a 
single author, we hypothesize that clerk turnover will decrease inter-year 
consistency.  
The dependent variable in our analysis is an inter-year consistency 
score. To construct the consistency score, we rely on the feature vectors 
 
 
 205. For this analysis, we used the Supremum Wald test in Stata. For additional background on 
this test, see generally Pierre Perron, Dealing with Structural Breaks, in 1 PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF 
ECONOMETRICS: ECONOMETRIC THEORY 278 (Terence C. Mills & Kerry Patterson eds., 2006). 
 206. The p-value was less than 0.01. 
 207. See generally Perron, supra note 205. 
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based on the texts a Justice authored in each year of his or her tenure. So, 
for a Justice with a term from 1950 to 1959 (inclusive), there would be ten 
feature vectors for that Justice. To calculate the consistency scores, we 
calculate the KL divergence between each year’s vector (interpreted as a 
probability distribution) and a feature vector based on the remainder of the 
Justice’s writings. These values are scaled in a similar fashion as the 
similarity scores discussed above and are summed. Figure 7 presents each 
Justice’s consistency scores ordered by median year of services. 
FIGURE 7: CONSISTENCY SCORES BY MEDIAN YEAR  
 
We examined the relationship between consistency score and the 
number of clerks that served in a Justice’s chambers over the course of his 
or her tenure. The time trend was controlled for through a quadratic 
function. We controlled for each Justice’s total production, under the 
theory that Justices who produce more may be more consistent, and there 
will be less statistical noise between years. We examined the interaction 
between clerks and time.
208
 
 
 
 208. For this analysis, we examine the period after 1885, with the introduction of clerks as 
“stenographers” under the Peppers grouping. We normalized the consistency scores using a cube 
function to construct Consist. The variable Clerks is the total number of clerks that served in a 
Justice’s chamber, divided by that Justice’s tenure on the Court, and normalized through a square root 
function. Prod is as described supra note 141. Year is year post-1885 (i.e., median year minus 1885).  
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TABLE 7: CLERK INFLUENCE ON CONSISTENCY 
 Consist Consist Consist 
Clerks -0.044 -0.048 -0.079 
 (10.32)** (12.22)** (4.19)** 
Prod  0.020 0.017 
  (4.19)** (3.90)** 
Year   0.002 
   (2.55)* 
Clerks*Year   0.001 
   (3.34)** 
Year2   -0.000 
   (3.35)** 
_cons 0.184 0.177 0.160 
 (39.10)** (39.21)** (10.61)** 
Adj. R2 0.63 0.71 0.77 
N 65 65 65 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, t statistic in parentheses 
Table 7 reports the results of an OLS regression with median year and 
clerks per year as explanatory variables of consistency scores. In the first 
model, additional clerks are associated with a reduction in inter-year 
consistency. This relationship holds when a Justice’s production is taken 
into account; that variable is significant and associated with increased 
consistency. Finally, in the full model, median year of service is 
significant, with a linear trend toward greater consistency and a squared 
trend toward lower consistency. The interaction between clerks and year 
indicates that clerks have had a less strong influence over time, perhaps 
indicating the declining marginal influence of an additional clerk as the 
Court has institutionalized a practice of each Justice having between four 
and five clerks.
209
  
Because the institution of the modern clerkship was introduced 
gradually over time, it is difficult to fully disaggregate the effects of clerks 
 
 
 209. As with the historical value analysis above, supra Part IV.A, we examine the interaction 
variable by analyzing significance for Clerks as Year increase. Clerks are a significant predictor up to 
roughly 1940, which appears to indicate that the effect on writing style of additional clerks occurred 
during the period in which the clerks transitioned from stenographers to a more substantive role. Once 
they were largely integrated into chambers, effects from additional clerks appears to have diminished. 
Significance reappears at the 10% threshold, with the reverse sign on Clerks, in the years after 1995. 
This appears to indicate that adding an additional clerk to chambers for today’s Justices would be 
unlikely to increase inconsistency from current levels, and might even have a positive effect (perhaps 
due to increased likelihood of inter-year holdovers). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1508 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1461 
 
 
 
 
from other time-dependent variables. We conduct one further structural 
break analysis based on the four Peppers groups, reported in Table 8.
210
 
TABLE 8: CHOW TEST ON CONSISTENCY SCORE  
First Period       Second Period F-value P-value 
(1791–1885)  (1886–1919) 8.5946 <.01 
(1886–1919)  (1920–1952) 5.5973 <.01 
(1920–1952)  (1953–2008) 4.2538 <.01 
(1886–1919)  (1920–2008) 5.8302 <.01 
 
The first three tests identify the likelihood that the coefficients in the 
Peppers groups are the same, rejecting the null hypothesis in all cases. We 
also compare the period of clerks as stenographers to the latter two periods 
and reject the hypothesis that the time trends have the same coefficient.  
It is worth remembering the difficulty of fully distinguishing the effects 
of unobserved time-related variables from the effects of clerks. 
Nevertheless, over the course of the twentieth century, the intra-year 
stylistic consistency of the Court as an institution has increased, while the 
inter-year consistency of writing style for individual Supreme Court 
Justices has declined. Over the same period of time, law clerks have 
become ever more integrated into the substantive work of the Court. 
Because the institution of the modern law clerk in the US Supreme Court 
evolved gradually over time, it is hard to know the degree to which clerks 
have contributed to changes in writing style, independent from some other 
set of time-related variables. But the information presented in this study is 
highly evocative. The turnover in each chamber every year of four clerks 
appears to reduce the writing style continuity that might otherwise exist, 
were Justices fully responsible for writing their own opinions. At the same 
time, these clerks appear to write similarly to their colleagues in different 
chambers, reducing the apparent stylistic differences between Justices. 
Thus, clerks can play a role in both increasing the consistency of the 
institutional voice of the Court and reducing the consistency of each 
Justice’s individual voice.  
 
 
 210. Unlike in the case of centroid distance, we do not carry out the additional structural break 
analyses discussed above. For centroid distance, we had a single measure for every year except 1802 
and 1811 and could construct an average for the two missing years without altering the data 
substantially. In the case of consistency scores, which are ordered according to the Justices’ median 
year of service, there are many years missing, and a number of years with multiple entries. 
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CONCLUSION 
Over the past several decades, there has been an explosion in 
quantitative analysis in legal scholarship. The lion’s share of that research 
has focused on the statistical analysis of hand-coded cases, typically 
oriented toward legal content. This research has spurred a number of 
interesting debates about law, politics, and various influences (and non-
influences) on judicial behavior. As computational text analysis has 
become more sophisticated and more accessible, scholars have begun to 
apply these tools to legal questions. The reduction of the costs of engaging 
in new forms of content analysis has allowed for new types of questions to 
be asked. 
This Article follows an important thread of this larger overarching 
effort and examines the stylistic features of judicial writings in 
quantitative terms. We offer several important innovations. We construct a 
unique dataset of all Supreme Court cases in which dissents and 
concurrences are separated from main opinions; these texts are coded with 
identifying information for year of publication and authoring Justice. This 
substantial dataset, along with advances in computational power, allows us 
to conduct re-analysis of prior research to examine its validity in light of 
the new data. But in addition, we newly apply the “stylistic fingerprint” of 
frequency of function words (a known general proxy for writing style) to 
investigate trends as represented in the full decision corpus.  
With this proxy variable, we test several hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is that there is a style of the time in the Court, such that 
contemporaneous Justices write more similarly to their peers than to 
temporally remote Justices. Our analysis finds extremely strong support 
for this hypothesis. We also examine some potential causes, finding little 
support for the claim that highly cited Justices exert greater-than-average 
stylistic influence, but finding some non-conclusive support for the 
possibility that changes in legal content may account for some of the 
change. Finally, we examine the influence of judicial clerks on writing 
style. Specifically, we test two hypotheses concerning the modern 
institution of the rotating judicial clerk. First is the claim that this 
phenomenon has led to greater intra-year institutional writing consistency 
on the Court. Second is the claim that clerks have led to less inter-year 
individual writing consistency for the Justices. We find reasonably strong 
support for both propositions, which are consistent with greater influence 
by a pool of clerks whose writing styles are similar to others in their 
cohort, although it is impossible to exclude the effect of unobserved time-
dependent variables on either. 
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Overall, we hope that the preceding analysis opens the door to new 
avenues of research of legal texts. In particular, we believe that there are a 
number of important and interesting research questions to be asked 
concerning the interaction of writing style on the Court with broader social 
and political trends. Specifically, Supreme Court opinions can be linked to 
other textual corpora, including appellate opinions and state opinions, as 
well as newspapers, published books, and Twitter feeds, among others. 
This textual data can be examined in light of more traditional social 
science sources, such as published economic (GDP, unemployment) or 
political (voting, electoral outcomes, campaign donations) data. Deploying 
the analytical tools described above, it may be possible to examine the 
interaction of writing style on the Court with courts more generally, with 
other forms of writing, and with broader social and political trends 
revealed in social science data. The possibilities of such analysis are 
exciting: human researchers can now find textual patterns that emerge at a 
macro-level, perceptible only recently with the digitization of vast textual 
corpora, the broad availability of massive computing power, and the 
continually evolving application of advanced concepts in mathematics and 
computer science to these “big” datasets. As these textual patterns become 
ever more perceptible, they offer the hope of new understandings in the 
use and evolution of language, from the staid chambers of the US Supreme 
Court to the unruly sprawl of the blogosphere. 
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